The United States, Great Britain, and Iranian oil, 1950-1954

This study examines the controversy surrounding the nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC). It races the events leading to Iran's nationalization of the company in 1951 and details efforts to negotiate a settlement that would reconcile Iranian grievances against the AIOC with British claims for compensation. Because the British and the Iranians sought, and ultimately received, American assistance in resolving their dispute, this study places the nationalization crisis in a tripartite framework. It reveals the global as well as the regional nature of a struggle that historians have slighted, and follows this struggle to the autumn of 1954, when the American government helped to organize an international consortium to replace the AIOC.;This study covers the nationalization imbroglio from a variety of angles. It draws on archives in Great Britain and the United States in order to integrate British and American policy into a coherent analysis. It uses similar sources, as well as the literature on Iran, to trace the Iranian side of the story, link the nationalization crisis to earlier and subsequent events, and place it within a global context. In addition, this study used the nationalization controversy to highlight some of the major themes in recent American, British, and Iranian history. It points up the increasing importance of the Middle East and its oil to the economic and national security policies of the Great Powers, and it connects this development to the rise of Third World nationalism. It also explores the character of the postwar Anglo-American relationship and revises the traditional view that American policymakers hegemonically imposed their will on helpless British officials. On the contrary, as this study reveals, British officials skillfully maneuvered their American counterparts into becoming ever-more involved in the Iranian crisis, but always on terms that suited Whitehall's purposes.