| Highly professionalized militaries whose focus is internal security and national development have been shown to be prone to active, directive involvement in politics. In Latin America, this phenomenon has been most notably evident in Brazil since 1964 and Peru between 1968 and 1980. The Venezuelan military offers a case of a more moderately professionalized military which was exposed to the widely disseminated internal security doctrine of the 1960s but, on the surface, exhibited declining levels of militarism. This study examines the varying levels of civilian control in Venezuela between 1945 and 1979 in the context of increasing military professionalization, and seeks to clarify the theoretical relationship between the two variables by using a unique, if not deviant, case. After developing a theoretical definition of the general concept of control, the study derives a definition of civilian control which employs civilian and military behavior, civilian and military attitudes, and military motivations. Application of this definition to the Venezuelan case indicates that civilian control has been more tenuous than more superficial observation would indicate. The study shows that increases in professionalization led to strains on the consolidation of civilian control, while also showing that limits on the level and content of professionalization enabled Venezuela to avoid authoritarian consequences. |
