| Decisions made regarding General George C. Marshall's Mission to China in 1945-47 as President Truman's Special Envoy are examined in this study, as are substantive questions regarding attempts by the Truman Administration to achieve peace, unity and stability in China. Relying on previously classified US State Department Documents, Marshall's Report of the China Mission, and Memoirs, policy options before and during the Mission are reviewed in order to determine why certain actions were taken.; President Truman's decision-making style reflected a keen awareness of domestic politics and an appreciation of foreign policy. However, after some initial bureaucratic wrangling over the Administration's China policy, Truman delegated most of the responsibility for its actual implementation to Marshall. In addition, though US-China policy objectives were rationally conceived by practical men, they were formulated to satisfy minimal rather than maximum goals, and were inherently conflicting and self-limiting regarding the resources available to achieve them.; Although Marshall was able to arrange for a ceasefire, a formula for political reconciliation, and military reorganization, these agreements were never implemented. Beyond the goal of repatriating Japanese forces, US policy was a failure. Marshall's dogged persistence coupled with Truman's unswerving support of Marshall's efforts were insufficient to solve China's political problems. Short of massive military intervention, which the United States was unprepared to undertake, there was no realistic alternative that the Truman Administration could have pursued. |
