| The dissertation begins with an overview of efforts to establish a psychology of jurisprudence. To be successful, a psychology of jurisprudence must include agreement upon a proper unit of analysis and the development of an epistemology. Based on the work of Petrazycki and Melton, it is suggested that the subjective experience of law would serve as a proper unit of analysis and an epistemology could be derived from examining the relationship of the subjective experience of law to formal legal structures of law. To build support for such a psychology of jurisprudence, an empirical investigation of the subjective experience of privacy is undertaken.;A review of the literature on privacy reveals the diverse and incompatible treatment that privacy has received both in law and social science. A psycholegal approach is proposed and the results of three studies based on this approach are presented. The studies examine the role of two variables--motive and type of intrusion--on ratings of offensiveness of various intrusions on privacy. Two initial studies were conducted to determine the effect of motive on judgments of invasions of privacy.;In Study I (n = 36), students were asked to rate, along a continuum of offensiveness, 12 short vignettes that presented potentially invasive activities. The vignettes varied in the rationales offered (beneficial, neutral, detrimental) for the invasions, and students were asked to award damages. In Study II (n = 146), vignettes were again presented, this time changing the neutral rationale and specifying a range for punitive and compensatory damages. Although the ratings of offensiveness varied as a function of the rationale given for an invasion in both studies, the type of intrusion was also indicated to be an important variable. Thus, Study III examined the effect of motive on conceptually different types of privacy interests. The results show that motive operates to justify some, but not all types of intrusions. The results are discussed within a context of a psychology of jurisprudence. |
