Officer role conception and military government in Latin America: A case study of Colombia

Using Colombia as a case study, this dissertation considers existing theory linking the establishment of Latin American military governments to officer professionalization oriented toward internal war. An alternative model is presented which de-emphasizes changes in societal role concepts as a factor of military political interventions and instead stresses anti-communist ideology as the single most important attitudinal factor likely to guide political behavior.;To the extent groups perceived by the military to be communist-oriented gain significant political power in Colombia, the United States-Colombian military relationship may be said to have increased the probability of military intervention into politics. Given the historical record, any such intervention by the Colombian military would probably be short-lived, and it is unlikely that there would ensue a protracted "government of the armed forces." To the extent non-revolutionary political institutions and mechanisms continue to dominate Colombian political history, the United States-Colombian military relationship cannot be said to increase the probability of political intervention.;Colombian military apolicity is rooted in a broadly shared, historical understanding of the civil-military relationship. This understanding is supported by the content of formal military professionalization. United States training of Colombian officers and adoption by the Colombians of considerable United States military doctrine appears to have supported the apolitical aspect of the professional self-image of the Colombian military. "Developmentalism" and training emphasis on civil-military counterinsurgency doctrine has not had an appreciable effect on the tendency of the Colombian military to be involved in politics. At the same time, the strongly homogeneous, anti-communist ideological preparation of the Colombian military officer has produced a military institution unlikely to accept any perceived dramatic power gain by either armed communist guerrillas or even legalized far-left political organizations. Thus, Colombia has a military which is both professionally oriented toward non-participation in civilian party politics and is nevertheless likely to intervene politically should a significant communist power gain seem likely. Battlefield success by the Colombian military against armed communist guerrilla groups would apparently lessen the probability of a military political intervention to the extent that the prospects of communist political gains are diminished. In this respect, external material support to the Colombian military could, in fact, lessen the likelihood of a Colombian military coup.