THE LEADER AS A SUBORDINATE: THE POLITICS AND PERFORMANCE OF UNIT COMMANDERS IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY

Since the All-Volunteer Army's inception, its performance has been sharply debated. By autumn 1978, however, the opposing positions had become fairly rigid and the arguments increasingly similar. Essentially, there are at issue two distinct conceptions of how to comprehend the Army and how to evaluate its performance. The Army's supporters suggest that the Army can be described as a set of discrete functional elements and that its performance is the sum of its successes in each functional area. If goals set for supply, personnel, training, and other operations are met, then the New Army must be a success. Army critics, however, contend that military performance is the product of small unit cohesiveness. They, therefore, cite evidence of the Army's changing social character and of conflict between officers and their soldiers as proof that the All-Volunteer concept has failed. Though each side contends that its view accurately depicts the character and quality of the Army, it seems more likely that each side only comprehends one aspect of a complex organization. To create a comprehensive view these competing perspectives must be integrated to form a single concept. To accomplish this, this study focused on the actions of combat company commanders in a single tank battalion. The company commander was selected as the proper subject for study because he is in daily contact with the soldiers who perform the Army's tasks and because he is ultimately responsible for the achievement of the Army's performance goals. Situated at the nexus between the Army's hierarchy and small unit activity, the company commander is necessarily both a personal leader to his men and a faceless subordinate in a vast organization. By viewing the Army from that position and by applying the elements of organizational power identified by Michel Crozier and Rosabeth M. Kanter, it is possible to assess the impact of organizational structures on the interactions between the company commander and his men. When this is done a picture of the Army emerges which conforms to neither position in the military debate. Commanders at all levels are ceding discretion to their superiors and to specialists. Concomitantly, the granting of rewards, such as promotion, is increasingly relegated to efficient, objective administrative systems and placed well beyond the control of commanders. As a result, the Army no longer can be described by an organizational pyramid. Instead it has evolved into a set of functional tubes, each tube separated from the activities of the others; especially from the control of unit commanders. The company commander, however, is pressed to meet every functional goal. Bereft of organizational power most company commanders choose to respond as subordinates; their actions become formalistic; and the performance of their unit declines to a level which is sustained despite, rather than because of, the company commander. In a few rare cases, company commanders choose instead to divorce themselves from the constraints of the formal organization and create informally the elements of power they need in order to lead. The result is a paradox. The more the Army asserts control to reduce uncertainty and insure performance, the more actual performance declines.