| Policies for peasant grain production and marketing and their results are inextricably linked to those for peasant class transformation. Nicaraguan state intervention in peasant grain production during the first five years of the Nicaraguan revolution is analyzed using class-based peasant categories. Grain policies and results are derived, first, from the pre-revolutionary historical and class basis of peasant grain production, and second, from the FSLN's changing policies and goals for both peasant transformation and grain production and marketing. Strengths and weaknesses within each component of the peasant grain program and response by members of each peasant category to state policy are evaluated, as are new state initiatives in 1984.;Distinct grain responses by peasant category imply that the peasantry cannot be treated as a homogeneous unit. The state is likely to achieve improved results once class has been taken into account. The dissertation argues that revolutionary transition confronts one of its most difficult problems in the tensions between peasant class transformation and macroeconomic goals. These problems are most likely to be resolved by a pragmatic, long-run policy of persuasion and example--as has been the case so far in Nicaragua.;It is concluded that Nicaraguan state intervention, via massive increases in peasant access to resources, contributed to national self-sufficiency in beans, some improvements in the economic conditions of poor and medium peasants, and the voluntary collectivization of a small but important segment of the peasantry. The problems of peasant grain production and marketing could not be overcome in their entirety, resulting in a deficit in marketed corn. Contributing factors included external and internal political, economic, and military pressures, as well as inadequate policy formulation on the part of the state. |
