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Collection Strategy Of Power Battery Closed-loop Supply Chain By Considering Channel Encroachment And Cooperation Under Government Intervention

Posted on:2022-01-30Degree:DoctorType:Dissertation
Country:ChinaCandidate:K LiuFull Text:PDF
GTID:1482306728986859Subject:Management Science and Engineering
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In recent years,wit h the rapid developm ent of ne w energy vehicles,the po wer batter y installed capacit y has also increased sim ultaneously,which m eans that po wer batteries will usher in a l arge-scale decommissioning tide.However,spent power batt eries will cause severe environm ental pollut ion if they are not treated in t im e or piled up random ly.T he governm ent has al ways paid att ent ion to the po wer batt er y recycling eff orts,and has issued relevant policies to suppo rt the power bat ter y recycling,such as governm ent deposit-subsidy policy and recycling subsidy policy.Po wer battery suppliers can eit her choose ne w energy vehicle m anuf acturers to collect power batteries or channel encroachm ent to directly collect power batteries.However,if the powe r battery supplier encroaches on the recycling channel,not only t he channel cost is considered,but also consider the decision of other m em bers of the power battery closed-loop supply chain(CLSC).Sim ultaneously,the govern m ent also encourages relevant ent erprises t o co-construct ion and sharing the po wer battery recycling channel in various f orm s.Furtherm ore,in the f ace of enterprises' diff erent risk pref erences,the uncertain sit uat ion of power battery demand and recycling,whet her batt ery suppliers should take the recycling channel encroachm ent strategy to bear part of the recycling responsibilit y is worthy of investigat ing.In the f ace of com petition and cooperation bet ween ent erprises and he supply chain,what kind of cooperation m odel should be t aken,and what kind of industry alliance is est ablished to increase the overall perf orm ance of the power battery recycling industry chain is also worth considering.This paper com bines governm ent subsidies and channel encroachm ent,risk aversion,dem and and recycling uncert aint y,recycling cooperation,supply chain com petition and cooperation,CLSC and supply chain coordination,and studies collection decisions of power battery CLSC wit h the consider at ion of chann el encroachm ent and cooperat ion under governm ent intervention,aim ed at providing m anagem ent and policy suggestions f or relat ed ent erprises and governm ent.The m ain work of this paper is summarized as f ollows:(1)The po wer battery CLSC collection strat egy c onsidering f or channel encroachment under government intervent ion.Based on the governm ent subsidy policy and channel encroachm ent strategy,the power battery collect ion strateg ies with/ without channel encroachm ent are studied consider ing the diff erent subsidies.Com parative analysis of optim al decisions in diff erent scenarios is perf orm ed,the inf luenc es of key param eters on equilibrium prices,ent erprise prof its,and social welf are are analyzed.It is f ound that subsidy to the new energy vehicle manuf acture r is m ore conducive to im proving enterprise prof its and social welf are.The battery supplier's channel encroachm ent strategy is m ore advant ageous f or po wer battery recycling.It is also possible t o achieve a "win-win".The governm ent should also actively guide ent erprises t o carry out recycling activities,increase publicit y,and raise public awareness of power batteries.(2)The power batt ery CLSC c ollect ion strategy considering f or risk pref erences and channel encroachm ent under governm ent int ervent ion.Based on governm ent subsidy policy and channel encroachment strat egy,a po wer batt ery CLSC gam e m odel wit h risk pref erences is established.The im pact of the int eraction bet ween governm ent subsidy and channel encroachm ent on optim al decisions,power batt ery collect ion,ent erprise prof its and social we lf are is analyzed.It is f ound t hat the channel cost and the governm ent subsidy level are essential f act ors aff ecting battery supplier decision.Governm ent subsidy can encourage the battery supplier to adopt an encroachm ent strategy to achieve a "win-win",but the governm ent also needs t o set a reasonable subsidy level,and it should not be too high.(3)The power battery CLSC c ollection strategy considering f or risk pref erences and cooperat ion under governm ent int ervent ion.The governm ent encourages po wer battery closed-loop supply chain enterprises to take various f orms,co-construction,and share waste po wer batt eries recycling channel.Based on this,the po wer battery CLSC gam e m odel consist ing of one bat tery supplier,one new energy vehicle m anuf acturer and one third-part y collector is construct ed,and the eff ects of diff erent recycling cooperat ion m odes on equilibrium strategy,power batt ery recovery rate,ent erprise prof its and social welf are are invest igated.It is f ound that recycling com petition and vert ical cooperation are benef icial to power battery recycling,which centralized rec ycling m ode is m ost advant ageous to po wer battery recycling.In contrast,horizont al cooperation bet ween the ne w energy vehicle m anuf acturer and the t hird-part y collect or m ay be m ore detrim ental t o powe r battery recycling.The degree of risk aversion and m arket f luctuat ions will hurt the utilit y of the supply chain,and the recycling subsidy is conducive to t he im provem ent of the utilit y of the supply chain and social welf are.Hence,the governm ent should set a reasonable level of subsidy.(4)The po wer batt ery CLSC collect ion strategy c onsidering supply chain com petitive and cooperat ive under governm ent intervent ion.Based on Shenzhen po wer batt ery deposit-subsidy policy,considering the com petition bet ween t wo po wer battery CLSC s which consist of one po wer battery supplier and one new energy vehicle m anuf acturer,the inf luence of diff erent com petition and cooperation m odes of the supply chain on po wer batt ery recovery rate,t he overall prof it of the supply chain and social welf are are analyzed.It is f ound that the vert ical(or horizontal)cooperation bet ween supply chain m em bers is conducive to the im provem ent of the po wer battery recovery rate.Howe ver,Shenzhen's current deposit subsidy strategy not signif icantly im prove the power battery recovery ra t e,so t he governm ent should increase the subsidy.
Keywords/Search Tags:closed-loop supply chain, power battery recycling, government intervention, channel encroachment, supply chain competition and cooperation, risk preference, stackelberg game
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