| In recent years,the recycling of power batteries has attracted much attention from all walks of life,and the government has also introduced relevant policies to guide it.On the one hand,power batteries ushered in a large-scale retirement period,and promoting recycling is a necessary measure to reduce environmental pollution.On the other hand,the supply and demand of raw materials for power batteries is tight and prices are rising,and recycling is an effective way to reduce their comprehensive costs.Power battery recycling needs to go through three stages: recycling,echelon utilization,dismantling and remanufacturing,and the existing remanufacturing process has great potential for improvement.At present,the cost of recycling power batteries is high,and enterprises are less motivated to recycle.In order to improve the current situation of low recycling rate of power batteries and realize the company’s cost leadership strategy.This thesis studies the recycling strategies of supply chain members,and considers the application of government guidance mechanism and process innovation around cost reduction and resource conservation to the closed-loop supply chain of power batteries.Firstly,three recycling modes are defined: the recycling mode of battery manufacturers(P mode),the recycling mode of new energy vehicle manufacturers(M mode),and the cooperative recycling mode between battery manufacturers and new energy vehicle manufacturers(PM mode).Secondly,this study establishes the dynamic game models of supply chains under different intervention mechanisms and different recycling modes.Then,the thesis explores the equilibrium solution of supply chain members and the whole in each situation,and draws the following main conclusions:(i)Under certain conditions,remanufacturing process innovation can improve the recycling price,recycling volume and supply chain profit of power batteries.When the level of process innovation has a large impact on cost savings and the cost factor is low,PB producers should improve the level of process innovation.Conversely,the level of process innovation should be reduced.(ii)The cost subsidy mechanism,reward and punishment mechanism and carbon trading mechanism can all improve the recycling price,recycling volume and process innovation level of power batteries.Under the three recycling modes,the wholesale price,retail price and demand of the battery are the same.The recycling price,recovery amount and process innovation level of power batteries in PM mode are the highest,and the lowest in M mode.(iii)PB producers have the highest profits under the PM model.Profits of NEV manufacturers: the highest in the M model under the government’s non-intervention,cost subsidies and carbon trading policies.Under the reward and punishment mechanism,when the target recovery amount is low and the reward and punishment intensity is high,the M mode is the highest,otherwise the P mode is the highest.The profit of the supply chain as a whole: when the government does not intervene,it is highest in PM mode within a certain range,otherwise it is highest in P mode.Under the cost subsidy and carbon trading policy,the P model is the highest.Under the reward and punishment mechanism,the highest is in PM mode.(iv)For PB producers,reducing the proportion of subsidized recycling is conducive to increasing the recycling volume and the level of process innovation.For NEV manufacturers and the supply chain as a whole,increasing the percentage of subsidy recovery can yield more benefits.(v)The recycling price,recycling amount and process innovation level of power batteries increase with the increase of rewards and punishments and carbon trading prices.Its wholesale price,retail price and market demand are not affected by the reward and punishment mechanism.However,when the cost of carbon emission reduction is lower and the price of carbon trading is higher,the implementation of carbon trading policies will reduce the price and increase market demand.In summary,remanufacturing process innovation can increase the amount of power battery recycling and bring more profits to the closed-loop supply chain.The government intervention mechanism can promote the recycling of power batteries,but the specific effect of which mechanism is better needs to consider the implementation strength.Whether or not the government intervenes,the PM model is more beneficial to PB producers.In most cases,the M model is more beneficial to NEV manufacturers,but the P model is more profitable when the target recovery volume is higher and the reward and punishment are low.The thesis has 56 figures,9 tables and 118 references. |