Research On The Choice Of Trade Dispute Settlement Mechanisms

Now, trade disputes are more frequent than before, so it is more important how to better resolve trade disputes. At present, economists focus more attention on the WTO dispute settlement mechanism than other dispute settlement mechanisms, and pay less attention to the choice of dispute settlement mechanism. For China, to settle disputes through bilateral negotiations is main dispute settlement forum. It isn't enough to settle disputes through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and other dispute settlement mechanisms. For this situation, China should continue to improve the choice of dispute settlement mechanism, to better promote the settlement of trade disputes. Therefore, the choice of dispute settlement mechanism has important theoretical and practical significance. The choice of dispute settlement mechanism as the research object, the thesis applies analysis in theory including welfare, game analysis, and empirical research including approach of statistics, econometric approach and case analysis, in aspect of unilateral action, bilateral negotiation, regional coordination, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The thesis draws a conclusion that the economic and political welfare of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is better than that of unilateral action, bilateral negotiation, regional coordination. But in the specific dispute, the choice of dispute settlement mechanism depends on games of both sides, in which political and economic factors affect equilibrium outcomes in games, and this has been supported by empirical research. Economic factors play an important role of settling disputes in China, and industry interest groups haven't enough influence. Based on this, the thesis gives some inspiration. The thesis makes research on these issues, including seven chapters.Chapter 1 is introduction and chapter 2 is literature survey. Chapter 1 mainly introduces background and meanings, research methods, research present situation, probable innovation and weakness, and draws a conclusion the research has important value. It isn't sufficient for the existing literature on the choice of dispute settlement mechanism, especially on the choice of dispute settlement mechanism in China, which raises the research problems.Analyzing the theory of unilateral action, bilateral negotiation, regional coordination, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism, Chapter 3 draws a conclution that unilateral action induces the welfare losses. Bilateral negotiation and regional coordination sometimes induce the welfare losses, particularly under the influence of interest groups. However, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism achieves welfare maximization. By comparision, the welfare of bilateral negotiation is better than that of unilateral action, and the welfare of regional coordination is better than that of bilateral negotiation. The welfare of the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the highest among them.Chapter 4 attempts to establish game model for the choice of dispute settlement mechanism, from unilateral action to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism and from bilateral negotiation to the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Political and economic factors affect the equilibrium result. Political factors make the disputes more frequent resort to WTO.Empirical research of Chapter 5 finds, in choosing dispute settlement mechanism, that if target country's economy depends on the US market, the United states is more likely to negotiate and to choose WTO litigation under the influence of political factors.In Chapter 6, the research draws a conclution, in settling disputes with developing countries, China applies bilateral negotiation. Settling disputes with the EU and US, China begins to apply the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. As a developing country, in choosing dispute settlement mechanism, China has different influence of political factors from interest groups in developed countries. Economic factors play important role of settling disputes in China, which has no-significant effect of interest groups. In settling disputes, the government's emphasis and role is great significant, which is further supported by Chinese case. At present, China mainly applies bilateral negotiation, and doesn't fully use the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. The use of various dispute resolution mechanisms is not sufficient. Based on this, the thesis gives some inspiration.Based on the whole conclusion, Chapter 7 again gives inspiration to China settling disputes. Bilateral negotiation is main settlement mechanism, WTO should be strengthened, other dispute settlement mechanisms should be payed more attention. And, industry interest groups should play an important role of settling disputes.