Mechanism Design Of Research And Development Cooperation And Patent Licensing In Pharmaceutical Industry

As the forefront of pharmaceutical industry chain,drug research and development process is the productivity of pharmaceutical firms and the important component of pharmaceutical innovation system.More and more large pharmaceutical firms form the strategic cooperation alliance in drug research and development with small and medium-sized biotech companies or research institutions through the various forms of R&D cooperation and patent licensing contracts.From the perspectives of R&D cooperation,innovation technology licensing and incentive mechanism design,this dissertation investigates the theoretical system and strategies of R&D cooperation and licensing mechanism design among pharmaceutical firms.And the conclusions of this dissertation provide practical operational solutions for the pharmaceutical firms.The specific research contents are summarized as follows.First,this dissertation examines a two-stage research and development(R&D)cooperation alliance including a marketer and an innovator,and investigates two types of R&D collaboration contracts: vertical R&D cooperation contract and co-development contract.The analysis reveals that no contract is always the best choice for the marketer.Specifically,the contract preferred by the marketer depends on the trade-off between the R&D efficiency and the sales efficiency of the marketer and the innovator,respectively.The marketer being involved in the R&D stage is not always in its best interest.The marketer does not always choose to sell the product,even when its marketing efficiency is high.Furthermore,under certain circumstances,it is more advantageous for the marketer to propose that the innovator sells the innovative product rather than doing so itself.Second,in view of the licensing strategy of innovative technology and the timing of patent introduction,a licensing contract with two different payment is investigated,in which the local pharmaceutical firm can choose to offer the licensing contract before or after the R&D stage.At the same time,co-development contract is considered to analyze the optimal licensing strategy of local firm.The main conclusion is that the optimal profit of the local firm under milestone payment is always no less than that under royalty payment.In addition,the optimal licensing time for the local firm is to offer the licensing contract before the development stage.When the R&D cost of the local firm is very low,co-development contract benefits him more.When the R&D cost is relatively high,the advance payment contract with milestone payment benefits the local firm more.Finally,this dissertation investigates a cooperation royalty contract design problem in a three-party pharmaceutical R&D alliance.Two different forms of cooperation between innovators are investigated: help and knowledge-sharing.This dissertation explores that there are complementary effects between the individual incentive and the team incentive.The non-cooperation contract would benefit the marketer most under some certain conditions.For an R&D task with high technical risk,the most effective measure for the marketer is to encourage innovators to share technology-related knowledge with another innovator.