Enterprise Technology Commissioned The Development Of Moral Hazard Prevention Analysis

The moral hazard has widely existed in various technical transaction activities. Standing in enterprise's angle, this article selects the commissioned technological development as the object to carry on the analysis, research how the enterprises guards against the moral risk in the technical request development.All of the analyses of this article are based on the analysis of the characteristic of commissioned technological development and its principal-agent relationship, as well as the forms and the reasons of the moral hazard occurred in commissioned technological development.According to the two kinds of reasons that moral hazard occurred in commissioned technological development: Encourage efficiency losing and the market environment's imperfect, this article studied the morals hazard precautionary measures that enterprises can take and the measures such as the environmental construction of the market and environmental construction of legal system, etc. from angle outside enterprise.This article has mainly studied the measures guarding against moral hazard—supreme contracts designing—which the enterprises can take. Because the long-term cooperation relationships generally exist in the cooperation between enterprise and the scientific research unit's, the article carry on the discussion separately: Single time cooperation relations and long-term cooperation relations. This article believed that, we should reduce the agent's moral risk in two ways: Increases the common interest between principal and agent, and reduced the information asymmetrical degree between them. The former one is refers to adopt the effective means of incentive and the latter one is refers to implement the effective surveillance mechanism. The article analyzes each kind of concrete relations from two aspects: Provides drove and implements the surveillance, the difference lies in, when we analyzes Single time cooperation relations, we considered providing dominance drove, but when we analysis long-term cooperation relations, we considered the prestige function of recessive drive mechanism.Under the framework of three-stage reference model concerningmechanism design, the paper analyzes the moral hazard of R&D units in the course of commissioned technological development. On the basis of research findings of both domestic and international scholars, it comes up with some new assumptions and sets up a framework which can analyze the moral hazard of hidden behavior and hidden information simultaneously. Based on the framework, it adopts Mirrlees-Holmstrom Approach to analyze the features of optical contract under each possible circumstance.