| With the development of Internet technology,more and more services can be provided and purchased online.Many service companies are trying to implement business model innovation based on platform strategy.They hope that this will bring more customers to the enterprise and the enterprise could use more resources,thereby obtaining competitive advantages such as faster demand response,more effective supply chain incentives,and new value creation.Service providers also have strong incentives to participate in online service provision,and online platforms can also bring them more potential benefits.Some objective factors will also accelerate the development of online services industry.Affected by the new crown epidemic in early 2020,telecommuting and remote provision of services have become more popular.In some online service industries currentlly,there are differences between online service platforms and general commodity trading platforms in terms of pricing,contract forms,and platform-user relationships.First,in terms of pricing and contract forms,in general online commodity trading platforms,the platform charges merchants a platform usage fee on the supply side of physical commodities.However,in many online service platforms,the platform will pay the providers of service products in exchange for the continuous service supply of the service providers on the demand side of the service platform.Moreover,in some cases,the platform will not only pay the service provider a share of the revenue based on each service transaction,but also pay a certain fixed remuneration.When there is uncertainty in the output and supply of services,the existence of fixed remuneration means that there may be a loss of efficiency in platform incentives,and this loss will be transmitted through the special structure of the platform organization.Second,in terms of the relationship between users and the platform.Some service providers only use online platforms for service transactions,some are completely employed by online service companies,and some service providers not only use the platform for transactions,but also sign a risk-sharing contract.These differences can be explained from the perspective of output uncertainty and platform effects.The previous theoretical research of platform has some deficiencies and limitations in analyzing the above differences.According to the analysis of this article,we can see that these deficiencies and limitations not only restrict our analysis of online service platform incentives,pricing,and business model choices,but also make our regulatory analysis of the rapidly developing online service industry blind spots.The resolution of these problems is of great significance for guiding business operations and formulating macro-industry regulatory policies.Therefore,the research on online service platforms needs a new theoretical framework to follow up.This paper firstly combines two-sided market theory and principal-agent theory to study the issues of incentives,pricing,and business model selection for online service platforms when there are output uncertainties.Then,on the demand side of the platform,by considering the demand side uncertainties caused by the supply side output uncertainty,this paper analyzes the efficiency loss transmission caused by the output uncertainty and its impact on the two-sided pricing of the platform,and gives the meaning of the corresponding regulatory policy.Finally,when analyzing the participation of part-timers and freelancers in online service platforms,by introducing time endowment constraints and the utilization cost of idle time,this article further analyzes the formulation of platform incentive contracts and other issues.Regarding the difference in the form of contracts between online service platforms and general commodity trading platforms,this article believes that:when there is uncertainty on the supply side,the optimal reward requires the risk sharing between the service provider and the platform,the contract between the platform and the service provider needs to include fixed remuneration and share remuneration based on output uncertainty;the strength of the cross-network externality of the service platform will affect the ratio of fixed remuneration to share remuneration,in some cases This will even affect the risk choices of service providers.Compared with general commodity trading platforms,online service platforms in certain industries also have different business model divisions.Different supply-side contract forms of platform correspond to different risk sharing,which in turn corresponds to different business models.In some online service industries,some service providers only use online platforms to conduct service transactions,some are completely employed by online service companies.And some not only use platforms for transactions,but also conduct transactions with online platforms,signing a risk sharing contract with the platform.Previous platform research paid more attention to defining different platform business models from the perspective of item flow and centralized pricing,and paid less attention to the issue of platform risk sharing.Different contract forms between the platform and one side service provider correspond to different risk sharing,and different risk sharing corresponds to different platform organization forms and business models.According to the follow-up analysis,we can see that this perspective not only allows us to better understand the value creation mechanism of online service platforms,but also can better make new recommendations for regulatory policies.According to different scenarios in reality,in addition to the supply-side output uncertainty,factors such as supply-side and demand-side crossnetwork externalities,demand-side network externalities,service provider time endowment constraints,and idle time utilization costs will also affect the specific platform incentive mechanism,which in turn affects platform pricing and business model choices.By combining two-sided market theory and principal-agent theory to establish an analysis model,this article analyzes different scenarios.First,it studies the incentives of online service platforms and the corresponding business model selection when there is an output uncertainty.Second,based on the basic model framework to introduce uncertainty on the demand side,this paper studies the impact of supply-side output uncertainty on the demand side of online service platforms,and then analyzes the online service platform pricing,business model selection,efficiency loss transmission and related regulatory implications.Third,by considering the time endowment constraints of service providers,this paper studies the platform's contract making strategy for part-time service providers.Fourth,through data collection and quantitative analysis,we conducted an empirical test on the main conclusions.The research work of this article is carried out from four aspects,and the main conclusions are as follows:First,considering the uncertainty of output on the supply side,this article starts with the incentive mechanism for service provider and risk sharing on the supply side of the platform,and explains the formulation of incentive contracts and business model selection.Based on two-sided market theory and principal-agent theory,a platform pricing model is established in which risks are shared between the platform and service provider,and the differences between the platform employment model,the pure transaction platform model and the traditional enterprise are compared.The study found that when there is output uncertainty,the optimal contract requires risk to be shared between the service provider and the platform,and the contract needs to include fixed rewards and shared rewards based on output uncertainty.The greater the cross-network externality,the lower the fixed compensation.The greater the uncertainty of the output,the smaller the proportion of shares,and the more risk-averse the service provider will aggravate this effect.Compared with the non-platform model,when the demand-side network effect is large,the platform and service providers that implement the platform employment model can obtain more network externality benefits,thereby enhancing the benefits of the entire service supply system;compared to pure transaction platforms the platform employment model allows the risk to be shared between the platform and the service provider,which overcomes the moral hazard caused by the uncertainty of output and improves the enthusiasm of the service provider.At this time,the platform employment model has also improved the efficiency of the entire service supply and transaction system.Conversely,when the above conditions are not met,other modes prevail.Second,considering the uncertainty of both the demand side and the supply side of the service platform,by using principal-agent theory and platform theory,the pricing strategy of the service platform is studied when there is uncertainty at both sides of the platform.And,based on equilibrium pricing,the service platform's business model selection conditions and efficiency loss transfer mechanism are analyzed.The study found that the higher the uncertainty on the demand side,the lower the platform's pricing on the demand side;the greater the output uncertainty on the service supply side,the higher the demand side pricing;the greater the network externality from the demand side,the pricing reduction of demand side caused by demand-side uncertainty is weakened.The greater the uncertainty of demand or output,the lower the share of remuneration in total remuneration,and the platform business model is closer to the employment or selfemployment model.If not,it is closer to the pure platform model.The efficiency loss caused by the uncertainty of the output side is transmitted between the two sides of the platform.Uncertainty on the service supply side makes the platform payment service supply side remuneration and demand side pricing increase at the same time,and the price increase on the service provider side is greater than the increase in product prices on the demand side.At the same time,the platform internalizes part of the efficiency loss,and the efficiency loss undertaken by the platform is proportional to the externality of the cross-network on the demand side.Therefore,the price regulation of such platforms must consider its hidden incentive efficiency costs.Third,based on the basic model in the previous chapters,time endowment constraints and idle utilization costs are introduced.The incentive problems are studied when there are a large number of freelancers and part-time jobs in the service industry,and the idle human resources are analyzed.After considering the leisure time constraints,the above conclusions about the incentive strategy of the service platform are still valid,but the leisure time will have a marginal impact on the equilibrium.As the cross-network externality on the demand side increases,the proportion of the platform paid to the service provider gradually decreases.At the same time,the fixed salary gradually increases,but this increase shows a decreasing trend.There is a positive correlation between the service provider's share ratio and the service provider's effort,but this relationship weakens as the service provider's leisure time increases.On the other hand,as the network externalities brought by service providers on the platform become larger,the platform charges more for the buyers.The utilization ratio of idle human resources on the platform is inversely proportional to the utilization cost,and this relationship strengthens with the increase in share rewards.At the same time,the allocation ratio of idle resources is positively related to the cross-network externalities on the service provider side.Fourth,based on twoisided market theory and incentive theory,the paper collects data through questionnaire surveys and builds an empirical model to analyze the relationship between output uncertainty and optimal incentive contracts.This empirical study mainly verifies the following questions: How does output uncertainty affect online platform incentive contracts and platform risk sharing;at the same time,the role of online platform platform effects(platform cross-network externalities)in this impact.By reviewing and summarizing previous research,this paper designs a measurement system for variable measurement indicators and online platform incentive plans that are in line with the industry's reality.Furthermore,these questionnaires are used to conduct questionnaire surveys on online service providers.Finally,the survey data of online service providers are used to perform quantitative regression analysis to verify the main conclusions of the theoretical model of this paper.The three important hypotheses proposed in this paper are fully supported,and are also supported in the robustness test of grouping and restricted regression repair.The innovation of this article is reflected in the following aspects:First,establishing a new analytical framework to meet new practical problems.In previous studies,the research on the choice of platform model was limited to comparing the pure trading platform model and the nonplatform self-operating model.This "one or the other" comparison ignores the intermediate situation.The reason for this problem is that although previous studies considered the impact of connection value and network effects on platform value creation and platform model selection,they seldom considered the impact of product production characteristics(output uncertainty)on value creation.Therefore,it is impossible to distinguish the difference between the platform employment model and the pure transaction platform.This is the main difference between this article and similar research.From a theoretical perspective,after examining the development path of the business model of traditional industries,this article finds that the platform model not only has advantages in matching two parties' transactions and creating network externalities,but also has its own advantages in motivating online platform service providers.This is one of the ways and special features of the platform model to create value in the service industry.This helps to better explain the incentives and business model choices of the online service industry.The new framework has good scalability,and we can use this framework to analyze emerging scenarios such as value creation,industry regulation,and utilization of idle resources.Second,drawing new theoretical conclusions and explanations.The conclusion of this paper is that the more uncertain the output,the more the platform will reduce the incentive ratio of service providers and increase the fixed wage ratio in order to ensure the stability of the output,which is quite different from the traditional incentive theory.Traditional incentive theory believes that if the agent is risk-averse and the principal is risk-neutral,the increase in uncertainty will lead to a decrease in the proportion of balanced share rewards.The theoretical research of the platform established by this framework also follows this logic to get corresponding conclusions.However,based on the analysis framework of this article,we found that in some cases,in order to maintain stable output and maintain the number of service providers and buyers,the platform and service providers share the risk,but the platform can use its own platform effects to influence contract formulation.For service providers,although there are more uncertainties,if the additional income brought by the externality of the platform network can compensate for this risk,compared to the non-platform model,choosing a higher-risk contract at this time is still consistent with the agent's overall expected benefits.At this time,network externalities will significantly affect the share ratio,which leads to a different conclusion from previous studies.This article is a supplement and innovation to the theoretical research on the platform and the labor incentive system research on the digital platform.Third,providing new theoretical support for online service platform supervision.Through the research on the pricing transmission mechanism of online service platforms,we found that not only the total compensation of the platform payment service provider has increased,but also the platform's pricing on the demand side.Uncertainty in the output of the service supply side brings about an increase in the price of products on the demand side,and the efficiency loss of the service supply side is transmitted from the service supply side to the demand side,and price is the transmission channel.Moreover,under certain circumstances,the price increase on the service supply side is greater than the price increase on the demand side,indicating that the efficiency loss on the service supply side has not been completely transmitted to the demand side.At the same time,due to the decline in platform profits,it shows that the platform itself has undertaken certain losses caused by price increases.At this time,if the regulatory authority only calculates the explicit cost of the platform to determine the regulatory price,under the lower price limit,the platform cannot share the losses caused by the uncertainty from both supply and demand side.According to the analysis framework of this article,the service supply of the platform will decline,and the regulated online service industry will shrink.This is an important supplement to the existing platform price regulation research of online service industry. |
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