Research On Behavior-based Pricing Discrimination Of Green Product

The COVID-19 pandemic has accelerated global consumer demand for green products.However,due to the lack of recognizable green products and few effective purchase channels and the price premium of green products beyond the scope of public acceptance,consumers’ willingness to buy green products and the occurrence of repurchase behaviors are weakened.Under behavior-based pricing(BBP),enterprises can fully consider the behavioral characteristics,payment willingness and subjective initiative of new and old customers and make dynamic pricing according to the purchase history to avoid customer loss caused by high pricing and profit loss caused by low pricing as much as possible,which is conducive to the promotion of green products in the market.Therefore,it is of great significance to study the differential pricing strategy of green products based on consumer behavior.Therefore,by analyzing the mechanism of BBP of green products,this paper focuses on how to implement BBP from four perspectives:heterogeneous consumers,different decision-making scenarios,different implementation channels and different subsidy modes.And the impact of BBP on the supply chain of green products is analyzed.To provide a useful reference for the implementation of BBP for green products and the orderly and efficient development of the green product supply chain(GPSC)based on efficiency and fairness.The results show that,firstly,with the increase in the initial market capacity of green products,the pricing strategy of green product manufacturers in non-supply chain environment changes from a loyalty price lower than the poaching price to a loyalty price higher than the poaching price.There is a negative linear correlation between the consumer share without preference difference and the pricing of green products and the profit difference between the two manufacturers.The difference in the consumption effect is positively correlated with the pricing of green products and the profit difference between the two manufacturers.Green subsidies have a significant negative impact on the loyalty price and poaching price of green products but do not affect the price difference between the two products.Green subsidies will increase the profits of green manufacturers.Second,a two-stage behavioral pricing model of the GPSC is constructed.It analyses the applicable conditions of behavioral pricing in decentralized and centralized scenarios of the GPSC,compares the optimal supply chain decision,profit and environmental impact under the two scenarios.And a GPSC coordination model based on revenue sharing under a behavioral pricing model is constructed.The results show that in a decentralized scenario,when consumers are not sensitive to the greenness of products,retailers of green products will increase their loyalty price as the market dominance of green products increases.An increase in greenness sensitivity and a decrease in the greenness cost coefficient will increase the wholesale price,loyalty price and poaching price of green products.Consumer attention to greenness will be conducive to promoting greenness,improving the environment,and bringing higher profits to manufacturers and retailers of green products.The centralized scenario of GPSC is beneficial to improve the greenness of green products,market share,profit,and environmental protection of the green supply chain.Therefore,the coordination model designed in this paper improves the profit of the GPSC in a centralized situation and contributes to the improvement of greenness,green product consumer surplus,social welfare,and environmental friendliness.Third,assuming that there are two types of consumers with different preferences for green products,we construct a two-stage game model of the GPSC and nongreen supply chains(NGSC)under three pricing strategies(uniform pricing,retailer BBP,wholesaler and retailer BBP)and compare the impact of different pricing strategies on GPSCs.We find that BBP can promote the improvement of the level of greenness and that the growth rate of the level of greenness is the fastest under the strategy with retailer BBP.Under each BBP strategy,the pricing strategy for green products in different sales stages is affected by factors such as the rate of consumers with no difference in preferences,the cost coefficient of the level of greenness,and the sensitivity coefficient of the level of greenness.BBP is beneficial for improving the profit growth rate of green product retailers with a decrease in the rate of consumers with no difference in preferences.Fourth,we compare and analyze the subsidy strategies of a green supply chain under BBP.It considers three different subsidy strategies,namely,government subsidies to manufacturers and retailers based on output,product greenness,and total R&D cost.BBP models under different subsidy strategies of GPSCs and NGSCs are constructed,and the effects of different strategies are compared.Our findings show that when the subsidy is based on output or green degree,the proportion of green product retailers receiving subsidies has only a positive impact on the wholesale price of green products,while when the subsidy is based on the product R&D input cost,it has a negative impact.When the product R&D input cost is subsidized,the loyalty price and poaching price of green products always increase with an increase in the subsidy coefficient.However,when the subsidy is based on output or green degree,the loyalty price and poaching price of green products increase or decrease with the increased subsidy coefficient.Finally,based on the above research conclusions,this paper provides policy suggestions on how to cultivate green consumption concepts and markets,how to effectively supervise and moderately encourage green products using BBP,and how to scientifically formulate green product subsidy strategies under BBP.