Diagnostic Test Decision Study On Key Core Products Of High-end Equipment Manufacturing Enterprises

High-end equipment manufacturing industry represents the country’s scientific and technological capabilities and comprehensive strength,for promoting the country’s high-quality economic development,to ensure national security has a very important significance.The development of China’s high-end equipment manufacturing industry is facing the problem of key core technology "neck",and the key core technology is restricted by others,which seriously affects the development of high-end equipment manufacturing industry.Therefore,this paper takes the key core product R&D supply chain as the research object and studies the role of diagnostic testing strategy in it.By the important characteristics of key core products of high-end equipment manufacturing industry,three factors of uncertainty of production reliability,long R&D production cycle and high complexity of product R&D production are extracted from R&D enterprises,and three most common contracts in production operation are selected: original contract,incentive contract and value co-creation contract to model and analyze the diagnostic testing decision behavior of R&D enterprises.With the goal of optimizing the entire R&D supply chain system,we examine how to guarantee the smooth R&D production of key core products,avoid delayed delivery and supply interruptions,while making the principal-agent parties obtain the maximum expected profit,achieve breakthroughs in China’s key core technologies,and promote the localization process of key core products.This paper further analyzes in detail the diagnostic testing decision of R&D enterprises under information asymmetry and the diagnostic testing decision of R&D enterprises under the presence of government subsidies.Specifically,three aspects are addressed.First,diagnostic test decision for key core products in high-end equipment manufacturing firms.The contract design problem of two-stage R&D production is examined for R&D firms(i.e.,agents)with uncertain production reliability.The CobbDouglas function is applied to portray the effort level and production volume of agents in different contracts at any moment,and the models of agent alone R&D and principal agent cooperative R&D are designed according to the different diagnostic test results,and the equilibrium of three contracts regarding the reliability level of agents and the optimal diagnostic test moment settings for each contract are obtained.The study shows that the original contract is suitable for agents with very high production reliability levels,while the incentive contract has a restricted range of application for agents with relatively low production reliability levels,and the value co-creation contract for cooperative R&D is available for agents with very low or relatively high production reliability levels.Also,for any contract,the agent’s effort level and principal profit are monotonic in terms of diagnostic testing time,and diagnostic testing should be performed as early as possible for all contracts except for the value co-creation contract,which is applicable to diagnostic testing performed late in the production phase.Second,considering the decision of diagnostic test for key core products in high-end equipment manufacturing firms under information asymmetry.We examine the incorporation of information asymmetry,study manufacturers’ invitation to R&D firms with uncertain production reliability to join in the game with monopolies,and analyze manufacturers’ quantity allocation and R&D firms’ contract selection problems.A principal-agent model is constructed to study the two-step choice problem of R&D firms: diagnostic test decision and production process improvement decision to help new R&D firms joining the market and manufacturers opting for localization to find satisfactory solutions with flexibility and modifiability.The study shows that: the degree of information asymmetry and the cost of diagnostic testing influence the contractual choice of R&D firms;manufacturers prefer to work with low-reliability suppliers who improve the production process or with high-reliability suppliers who perform diagnostic testing within a certain level of production reliability of R&D firms.Third,considering the diagnostic test decision of key core products of high-end equipment manufacturing firms under government subsidies.We refine the incentive bonus into government subsidies,combined with the specific policy of Shanghai Municipal Commission of Economic and Information Technology on the first breakthrough special for high-end equipment,carved out the subsidy ratio of different product quality levels corresponding to the supplier as Stackelberg leader of the two-stage model of R&D period and warranty period,to study the level of product quality and consumer preference on government subsidy decision and diagnostic The impact of testing decisions.The government subsidy adoption equilibrium as well as the diagnostic test decision equilibrium of R&D firms were obtained,and the interaction effects between government subsidy adoption decision and diagnostic test decision were analyzed.The study shows that the adoption of government subsidies provides R&D firms with direct financial support to provide the possibility of diagnostic testing,and accordingly,the presence of diagnostic testing motivates R&D firms to adopt government subsidies,while the interaction between the two decisions takes on a new aspect when the product quality level is relatively high,i.e.,R&D firms adopt government subsidies and do not perform diagnostic testing.The innovations of this paper are that: the rationality of two R&D modes(independent R&D and collaborative R&D)in the R&D of core products of high-end equipment manufacturing industry is discussed,and the optimization of the optimal parameters in three contracts(collaborative contract,incentive contract and value co-creation contract)is completed.Further detailed studies are conducted at the micro and macro levels for incentive contracts and co-creation contracts,respectively,to explore the role of enterprises’ diagnostic test decisions and improved production process decision choices on risk warning and avoidance in an information asymmetric environment,as well as the interaction of diagnostic test decisions on government subsidy adoption decisions in the larger environment considering both R&D and quality assurance stages.