| The report of the 20 th Party Congress clearly points out that China has started a new journey to build a modern socialist country in a comprehensive manner,and the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation has entered a critical period.Continuing to deepen the reform of the science and technology system,establishing an enterprise-oriented and market-oriented national innovation system that promotes the deep integration and development of industry,academic and research,and improving the national innovation capacity and international competitiveness in science and technology are the inevitable requirements for implementing the innovation-driven strategy and achieving high quality development led by innovation.Vigorously developing an enterprise innovation system as the main body,guided by innovation policies,and aiming at establishing a perfect innovation ecosystem,encouraging and supporting a wide and in-depth participation of multiple subjects within the innovation system in innovation activities to achieve the strategic objectives of innovation is the focus of both theoretical and practical attention.A review of the theoretical findings on innovation systems,innovation agents and the evolution of innovation systems at home and abroad reveals that the competing games between enterprises,enterprises and policies,and enterprises and the market are the typical relationships between multiple agents participating in innovation activities during the development and evolution of innovation systems.However,the existing studies have paid less attention to the multi-factor collaborative evolution of the innovation system,and more research has been conducted on traditional innovation forces,while little has been done on the important role of emerging market innovation forces,especially the public,in the innovation system.The phenomenon of firms adopting innovation manipulation to capture innovation policy dividends and the heterogeneity of implementation objectives between central and local governments in the innovation policy system are not sufficiently focused.In view of this,this paper builds a framework for analyzing the game and evolution of innovation systems based on innovation theory,social network theory,complex network theory,evolutionary game theory and transaction cost theory,and based on the time-series evolutionary pattern and characteristics of innovation systems,the evolutionary game of cooperative innovation between enterprises and firms based on the perspective of reference dependence and network cost,the evolutionary game of innovation manipulation between government and high-tech enterprises based on the perspective of central government supervision and intervention,and the evolutionary game of innovation manipulation between government and high-tech enterprises based on the perspective of central government supervision and intervention.The theoretical and empirical studies are conducted on the evolutionary game of the government-industry-academia-application quadrilateral game based on the perspective of industry-academia-research innovation consortium,with a view to clarifying the evolutionary characteristics and game mechanism of the innovation system,and providing empirical evidence for promoting cooperative innovation among enterprises,preventing enterprise innovation manipulation and deepening multi-body collaborative innovation in the innovation system,and better implementing the innovation-driven strategy.Compared with the existing studies,this paper has the following innovations: Firstly,it considers the competing relationship between innovation agents from the initial,development and stability stages of the innovation system,so as to realize the correspondence between different development stages of the innovation system and the competing behaviours of innovation agents,and to realize the systematic analysis of innovation agents from mono,binary and then multi,so as to build up a complete analytical framework.Secondly,it analyses the competition game between enterprises and firms from the perspective of innovation network costs,which expands the research perspective of the cooperation game between enterprises and refines the focus of the cooperation game between enterprises.Thirdly,the evolutionary game between the government and enterprises is analysed from the perspective of goal heterogeneity between the central and local governments,which is more suitable for the reality of China’s hierarchical system.Fourthly,users are included in the framework of the quadratic evolutionary game of innovation agents,and a cooperative picture of the equilibrium game of different innovation agents during the stability of the innovation system is constructed.Through the above analysis,the empirical research results obtained in this paper are.(1)Taking the smart driving innovation system as an example,a multiple complex network model is constructed to analyse the policy elements,subject elements and network structure evolution time sequence characteristics of the innovation system and it is found that:(i)China’s smart driving industry innovation policy system is gradually taking shape,but the policy level is not high and the target positioning is low.It is highlighted that there are fewer policies at the national level and more policies at the provincial level;more policies to regulate the development of the industry and fewer policies to promote the development of the industry.(ii)Both innovation sub-networks and multiple innovation networks conform to the characteristics of complex networks;the scale of cooperative links among subjects within the innovation system is small,especially the density of cooperative innovation among enterprises is low.(iii)The innovation system has the characteristics of cyclical evolution;the innovation system of the intelligent driving industry is a process of multi-factor collaborative evolution and mutual adaptation,and the innovation system subjects are generated and the network structure changes with the evolutionary changes of the policy;the policy is adjusted with the changes of the innovation system.(2)By establishing an evolutionary game model of enterprises based on prospect theory and network cost theory,analyzing the competing game of enterprises within the innovation system and how to improve the cooperation density between enterprises,it is found that:(i)Enterprises are sensitive to innovation network cost,and the lower the innovation network cost,the higher the cooperation level;the smaller the constant coefficient of network cost,the slower the innovation network evolves to reach stability,the marginal coefficient has the opposite effect to the constant coefficient The marginal coefficient is the opposite of the constant coefficient,and the speed of evolution is more sensitive to the marginal coefficient.(ii)The higher the risk preference coefficient,the higher the loss sensitivity and the higher the innovation self-confidence(innovation self-perception),the more likely it is that firms will engage in collaborative innovation.(iii)The higher the cost of innovation,the greater the payoff gap,the greater the knowledge translation capacity and the lower the cost of default,the more firms tend to innovate independently(imitative innovation).(3)By constructing a dual scenario evolutionary game model of corporate innovation and local government supervision with or without the participation of the central government,we analyse the R&D manipulation behaviour of enterprises in the innovation system and the choice of local government’s innovation supervision strategy and find that:(i)Reducing the absolute tax revenue of the high tech enterprises to be evaluated before obtaining the high tech status is conducive to reducing the probability of R&D manipulation speculation of the high tech enterprises to be evaluated.However,it is easy for local governments to fall into "negative regulatoryism".(ii)The greater the innovation performance of local governments and the cost of regulation,the easier it is to fall into the ’win-win trap’ of ’profit’ for government innovation performance and ’profit’ for innovation manipulation by the high-tech enterprises to be evaluated.(iii)The involvement of higher authorities in the regulation of R&D manipulation can promote genuine innovation by the high-level enterprises to be evaluated and avoid the occurrence of "manipulative" strategies.From the perspective of regulatory efficiency,although the intervention of high-level regulation will increase the risk cost of the high-level enterprises to be evaluated,it will significantly reduce the probability of regulatory inaction of the local government.(4)By constructing a four-party evolutionary game model of government,enterprises,academic and research departments and user groups,and using Liapunov’s first criterion to analyse the stability and factors influencing the strategy choice of multiple subjects,we found that:(i)government’s strengthening of regulation and increasing the probability of third-party institutions to combat counterfeiting can effectively promote the probability of cooperation between industry and research.(ii)The stable equilibrium point strategy choice of government departments is lax regulation,and the speed of tending to lax regulation is influenced by government regulation into,and the stable equilibrium point strategy choice of user groups is direct trust and influenced by discrimination cost.(iii)The probability of choosing a non-cooperative strategy within the industry and research community increases due to opportunism,and increasing the penalties of external regulation can effectively promote cooperation between the two parties.When the internal temptation is small,the cooperation between the two sides of industry and research can make the system reach the optimal strategy combination goal of four-way equilibrium of lax regulation,cooperative innovation,active innovation and direct trust.Based on the results of the empirical study,the possible policy implications of this paper are as follows: First,we should follow the law of historical evolution of innovation systems,scientifically establish and improve China’s innovation system,and promote cooperative innovation of multiple subjects through policy instruments compatible with incentives and constraints based on the behavioural motives of innovation subjects.Secondly,we should continuously reduce innovation transaction costs through tax incentives and financial subsidies,clarify the responsibilities and objectives of central and local government supervision,and build an innovation supervision system with the participation of multiple subjects and collaborative governance.Thirdly,we should create an internal and external environment for cooperative innovation by multiple subjects in the innovation system,so as to fully release the innovation vitality of each subject and achieve the Pareto optimum of innovation objectives,innovation performance and innovation investment. |
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