Research On Incentive Mechanism Of Returning Entrepreneurial Talents Based On Evolutionary Game

Talents are the source of competition and vitality for rural revitalization.The governments(including the central and local governments)are the main promoter of rural talent revitalization.The government’s decision-making reflects the national will,national strategy and national behavior,and is also the development direction of scientific decision-making according to the needs of social development at each stage.With the improvement of the national economic level,the high-level construction of the city provides superior conditions for the development of talents in the city.The negative impact of the urban-rural dual structure is becoming more and more serious,and the gap between urban and rural areas is gradually increasing.Therefore,the arduous task of building a modern socialist country with Chinese characteristics falls in the countryside,and the most potential and profound foundation also falls in the countryside.The realization of rural revitalization cannot be separated from the participation and contribution of governments and talents at all levels.However,in some rural areas with weak foundation,the problem of talents unwilling to return home to start a business is very prominent.In order to enrich the systematic theoretical research on the return of rural talents in China,the following research has been done to improve the talent introduction mechanism.Firstly,this paper chooses the central government,local government and returning entrepreneurial talents as the three participants with different goals and utility,analyzes the interests and behaviors of the participants who promote the return of talents to start their own businesses.Using the method of evolutionary game,this paper constructs a model of talent return home entrepreneurship based on evolutionary game model,analyzes the evolutionary strategy and its stability,and explores the influence of different factors on strategy selection.The evolution results are simulated by MATLAB software to verify the correctness and rationality of the equilibrium point and the applicability of the evolutionary game model of returning entrepreneurial talents.Then,the incentive mechanism of returning home entrepreneurship based on evolutionary game is established.According to the above research,the restrictive conditions for promoting the evolution of the positive strategy of the game subject are obtained:(1)The difference between the cost of the central government ’s active formulation of policies to promote the construction of incentive mechanism and the cost of negative formulation of policies is less than the cost of sending professionals to local research to provide talent strategies to adapt to local development.(2)The difference between the cost of the local government to meet the positive and negative implementation of the policy is less than the loss of population loss,further poverty,the central government’s warning,the loss of notification of criticism and punishment,and the honorary title of the rural talent revitalization demonstration province(city,district,county),the sum of the policy tilt reward deducts the benefit of sending professionals to local research to provide talent strategies adapted to local development.(3)The incentive cost of governments at all levels is less than their income,and the central government ’s support for local government talent policy is greater than the cost.(4)The income deduction cost of returning entrepreneurial talents is greater than the loss of service perception and loss of confidence in rural development and the loss of happiness of talents in urban development.The total income of returning entrepreneurial talents is greater than that of non-returning entrepreneurs.Finally,the incentive countermeasures and conclusions of the central government-local governments-returning entrepreneurial talents are proposed from three aspects: 1.The central government strengthens the dual orientation of positive policy guidance and negative incentive and restraint.2.Local governments play a dual role of health factors and incentive factors.3.Returned entrepreneurs pay attention to the dual constraints of personal income and cost loss.It provides useful experience and suggestions for returning entrepreneurial talents to adopt incentive measures for returning entrepreneurial strategies and behaviors.