| Following the establishment of the household contract responsibility system and the dismantling of the people’s communes,the rural cooperative economy,which had once retired from the stage of history,has once again come to life.What are the links between today’s rural cooperative economy and the one before the reform and opening up,whether there is a pattern in the evolution of the rural cooperative economic organization system?What is the performance of China’s rural cooperative economy at this stage?How to draw lessons from the development of China’s rural cooperative economy,to promote the development of the rural economy effectively,and what are the main obstacles to the rural cooperative economy today and what is the way forward?Guided by the above questions,this study takes production cooperatives as a representative of China’s rural cooperative economy and conducts a corresponding study.Firstly,this study theoretically explores the institutional evolution of rural production cooperatives before Chinese "reform and opening up".According to the basic historical facts,we summarize the institutional evolution of China’s production cooperatives in terms of transaction cost theory,changes in marginal benefits,the rational construction and spontaneous institutional evolution.Then,on the basis of sorting out the relevant institutions,we address several major forms of cooperation after the reform and opening up.Corresponding game analysis and case discussion are conducted for these shareholding cooperatives,professional cooperatives,entrepreneurial cooperatives,and cooperatives that are difficult to integrate with upstream and downstream market players in the supply chain.The results show that although evolution and game is described at different levels of the economy and are incommensurable in terms of methodology,evolution and game are symbiotic in real economic activities and the analysis of institutional evolution should include the explanation of the symbiotic phenomenon of both.The Great Leap Forward and other cooperative movements of the same period before the reform and opening up was relatively unsuccessful constructs,and although in the short term a short-lived equilibrium was created under the strong influence of individual consciousness and the context of internal and external problems,in the long term it did not conform to the basic laws of evolution.In terms of the several organizational forms of the co-operative economy that has emerged since the reform and opening up,the shareholding system is the most widely distributed co-operative institutional structure today,divided into three main types of co-operative enterprises,shareholding co-operatives and informal,unstable holding co-operatives.Of these,the third form is the most widespread.In terms of motivation,shareholding co-operatives are formed in areas where new rural areas are being transformed and where fixed assets such as land is being divided up,while peasant co-operatives are small co-operatives that have formed spontaneously in remote rural areas in the context of the division of labor.The above two types of cooperatives are constrained by the rationality of other external systems,such as the positioning of market subjects,the system of power distribution,and the management and financial systems,etc.An imperfect system will lead to the loss of the advantages of the cooperative system and reduce the rationality of the allocation of production factors.The above two types of cooperatives are mainly restricted by the rationality of other external systems,such as market subject positioning,power distribution systems,management and financial systems.The imperfect system will lead to the loss of the advantages of the cooperation system and reduce the rationality of the allocation of production factors.The two forms of cooperative economy are not only affected by the above-mentioned system,especially the market equality system,which is more vulnerable to the contract,a micro system that involves the distribution of rights and obligations between market entities.Unreasonable contracts will significantly reduce the efficiency of a single cooperative cooperation with enterprises or other market entities,create the risk of default,and reduce the enthusiasm of farmers to participate in the cooperative economy.In order to investigate the rationality of the current system of production cooperatives and to provide policy recommendations for future institutional development,this study explores the micro and macro aspects of the development performance of production cooperatives under existing policies and analyses the mechanisms that influence several key factors of cooperative performance.The results of the study show that the system for the selection of model cooperatives is inefficient in the short term,while other systems related to the rural cooperative economy are effective and rationally constructed at the current stage of development,and have contributed to the economic growth and upgrading of the industrial structure in China to a certain extent.In terms of the analysis of the main factors influencing performance,the results show that the distance from the cooperative to the agricultural administrative authorities at all levels significantly affects performance,suggesting that the construction of the system will significantly influence the way the market allocates resources,which in turn affects the behavioral choices of the cooperative and the farmers.Therefore,the construction of institutions should be gentle and prudent to avoid the negative effects of irrational institutional construction.The differential effects of the cooperative surplus distribution system on different types of cooperatives suggest that the rationality of the system should be judged in the light of the actual economic development,and that the cost of the system should be taken into account in order to reduce the one-size-fits-all" model of system construction.Family participation,as an informal system,also affects the effectiveness of the formal system.Under a well-developed internal management system,the social network formed by family relations will be a lubricant for the cooperative.On the contrary,family participation may reduce the efficiency of the cooperative to some degree.Finally,in terms of technological innovation,although technological developments and innovations such as cold chain logistics technology have reduced the cost of loss of agricultural products in cooperatives,these technological innovations play a different role in different enterprises,with those that has standardized management systems and higher levels of management,the setting and consideration of non-instantaneous spoilage coupled with optimal discount pricing strategies has further improved the level of development of the enterprise,which in turn provides the financial basis for further technological innovation.The financial basis for further technological innovation.Conversely,in companies with poorly structured management systems,it is difficult to convert cost reductions resulting from technological innovation into capital elements for further technological upgrading,so that the positive interaction between the structure of the system and further technological development is difficult to achieve.Based on the above content,this study proposes relevant policy recommendations.According to the law of changing transaction costs of policy change,the marginal benefits of policy change in any direction tend to increase and then decrease.Under the logic of institutional rational construction and spontaneous evolution,institutional change at this stage should focus on the accumulation of common knowledge and the full utilization of local knowledge by participants in institutional change,to avoid compulsory institutional changes that are not in line with the laws of economic development.Only a system that constructed rationally and spontaneously evolves is a good system that adapts to the laws of development.A system that ignores the laws of spontaneous evolution and constructed irrationally,is still a system that does not adapt to economic development,even if it is constructed under certain conditions and to the exclusion of all others.At the present stage,the development of production cooperatives in China,is generally in the direction of promoting economic growth and improving the industrial structure.However,there is still a tendency in some regions to "build societies in motion" in order to improve political performance,ignoring the basic laws of economic development.In order to promote the development of cooperatives and improve the quality of economic development nationwide,this study proposes that the development of cooperatives should be strictly controlled.This study proposes to strictly adhere to the"voluntary" bottom line of cooperative development,to strictly observe the economic law that production relations are appropriate to the level of productivity development,to promote the joint construction of internal and external institutions,and to place cooperatives within the overall framework of local economic development. |
