| To encourage enterprises to carry out technological innovation activities,the government usually implements various subsidy policies to reduce the innovation cost or increase the innovation income of enterprises.Although innovative subsidy policies can be seen in various countries and industries,and academics have also conducted extensive discussions on this,there are at least two deficiencies: First,some important influencing factors,such as the market competition environment,has not been included in the scope of the study;second,there is still a lack of systematic research on the impact of various subsidy policies on the decisions and benefits of various actors.This leads to insufficient theoretical guidance during the implementation of the subsidy policy.This paper adopts the paradigm of theoretical analysis and establishes a series of game models to systematically analyze the influence mechanism and results of government innovation subsidies on enterprise technological innovation activities from the micro decision-making level.In the analysis,this article considers four factors that reflect the characteristics of innovation activities(the level of innovation goals set by R&D companies,the expected R&D cycle of innovation activities,the economic transformation efficiency of new technologies,and the uncertainty of R&D activities),two four types of market competition environments(in horizontal competition,we consider the competition between manufacturers and R&D companies;in vertical competition,we consider R&D companies to encroach the manufacturer’s product market and manufacturers to encroach the R&D company’s technology R&D market.),and two government subsidy strategies(price subsidies and cost subsidies).The main analysis method is comparative analysis.Through comparative analysis of the impact of different subsidy policies on the government’s expected income,the applicable conditions of different government subsidy policies are analyzed.Through comparative analysis of the influence of different government subsidy policies on enterprise R&D investment,the crowd-in and-out effect of government innovation subsidies on enterprise R&D investment is analyzed.It also analyzes the impact of different subsidy policies on the expected earnings of R&D companies and manufacturers,as well as the impact on the total surplus of consumers who purchase different products.Through deduction and analysis of the model,the following conclusions are drawn.1.Each innovation subsidy policy has its own applicable conditions,there is no subsidy policy that can be applied to various competitive markets.First,the type of market competition determines the number and type of market subjects and determines the structure of supply chain.Then,the intensity of market competition and the characteristics of innovation activities of R&D companies determine the critical point of subsidy.2.The influence of government innovation subsidy on enterprise R&D investment has crowding in effect or crowding out effect.What effect depends on the location of the R&D company in the supply chain.The type of market competition determines the structure of the supply chain,and the structure of the supply chain determines the position of the company engaged in R&D activities in the supply chain.It determines whether the influence of government subsidy on R&D investment is crowding in effect or crowding out effect.When R&D companies are at the intersection of two product lines,government subsidies always have a crowding-in effect on their R&D investment.If the R&D company is not at the intersection of the two product lines,the impact of the government innovation subsidy on the innovation investment of the R&D company needs to be further analyzed according to the specific situation.3.the impact of government innovation subsidies on the expected returns of R&D companies depends on the location of R&D companies in the supply chain: if R&D companies are at the intersection of two product lines,government innovation subsidies will always increase the expected returns of R&D companies.If R&D companies are not at the intersection of two product lines,the usual scenario is that if R&D companies are in a governmentsubsidized product line,the expected returns will increase and vice versa.4.When the producer is at the intersection of the two product lines,government innovation subsidies increase the producer’s expected earnings;when the producer is not at the intersection of the two product lines,the impact of government innovation subsidies on the producer’s expected earnings is related to consumers’ mental valuation of the product,the intensity of competition in the market,and the characteristics of technological innovation.5.The effect of government subsidies on the total surplus of consumers who buy different products is closely related to the competitive environment of the market,the psychological valuation of the products by consumers,the degree of fierce competition and the characteristics of innovation activities of R&D companies.This paper abandons the empirical research methods commonly used in the field of innovation subsidy policy research,focuses on the micro decision-making level,and analyzes the applicable conditions of each innovation subsidy policy in different market environments by constructing a game model that can reflect the characteristics of innovation activities and the impact of subsidy policies on the decision-making behavior of various actors.The method of modeling and analyzing government decision-making behavior based on vertical differentiation theory provides a new reference perspective and ideas for subsequent research on innovation subsidy policies,and it also has a certain practical guiding significance for the government to formulate effective subsidy policies to encourage enterprise innovation. |
