Green Production And Green Certification Strategies Of Sustainable Agricultural Supply Chains

With the intensification of agricultural pollution and consumer demand for green agricultural products,more and more traditional agricultural producers are turning to green production.Meanwhile,with people’s attention to the quality and safety of agricultural products and the development of information technology,consumers expect agricultural producers to provide accurate quality and safety related information for their products.This dissertation studies the sustainable agricultural supply chain from the perspectives of reducing environmental pollution and ensuring the quality and safety of agricultural products,so as to realize the sustainable development of agriculture.This dissertation separates certification from production.For the agricultural products that fail to reach the green production standard,this dissertation considers that the traditional agricultural producers invest green production efforts in the long term.This dissertation also studies the effects of the firm’s cost-sharing and government subsidy on green production.For the agricultural products that have already reached the green production standards,this dissertation weighs the benefits brought by certification and the additional certification costs,and studies the green certification strategy of agricultural products supply chain considering the producers’ competition based on customers’ preferences for a product’s brand,price,safety,and other factors.These problems not only have certain theoretical innovation,but also have important practical application value.This dissertation applies information asymmetry theory,game theory,bayesian theory,and other theories,and uses the methods of mathematical modeling and numerical simulation to study the above problems.The main research contents are divided into the following four parts:(1)The basic models as Stackelberg games in normal forms consisting of one retailer and one producer under information symmetry and information asymmetry are established to form the profit matrix.Then,based on the profit matrix,we analyze the evolutionarily stable strategy of several producers and retailers playing as a two-player game.Results indicate that(Conversion,Sharing)equilibrium can be easier to achieve with higher customers’ green preference and lower effort costs,whereas(Conversion,Non-sharing)equilibrium can be easier to achieve with more accurate forecast information.A higher initial conversion state prompts retailers to evolve to Sharing more quickly and vice versa.(2)This chapter studies a three-stage game model between the government and an agricultural products supply chain where a leading firm contracts with multiple farmers.The firm,as the leader of the supply chain,procures products from multiple farmers.The local government encourages farmers to adopt green production by providing effort subsidy or quantity subsidy,and the firm shares a portion of effort costs.The optimal green production effort,wholesale price,and government subsidy are determined,and the impacts of different parameters on the decisions with the endogenous or exogenous subsidy are analyzed.This chapter also determines the types of subsidies from the perspective of the government.Results show that when the subsidy is endogenous,the effort subsidy is better than the quantity subsidy because the government expenditure under the effort subsidy is smaller with the same effect of pollution control.When the subsidy is exogenous,the government should adopt the quantity subsidy if the enterprise shares more effort costs.(3)By considering the trade-off between the profit gained from green labels and additional costs of certification,this chapter investigates the agricultural supply chain where a leading retailer procures from two producers with different brands.Customers care about both brand value and quality when purchasing the product.This chapter explores the green certification and wholesale pricing strategies for producers,and the producer selection and retail pricing strategies for the retailer.Results show that certification may not always benefit producers,and when two producers adopt certification strategies simultaneously,they will fall into a “prisoner’s dilemma” with a high certification cost and low health utility from green labels.(4)This chapter studies the case where some small-scale agricultural producers do not have the qualifications to apply for green certification facing uncertain safety perception information brought by green labels without the farmers’ organization.The strategy of demand information disclosure for the organization and the strategy of product information disclosure for small-scale producers are studied in this dissertation.Results show that a“win-win” situation for producers can occur by means of group certification with a rational portion of revenue sharing.A more transparent market is not necessarily desirable for customers and social welfare.The research results of this dissertation effectively integrate sustainable agricultural products supply chain and information disclosure theory at the theoretical level and analyze the complex behavior of multiple subjects in the supply chain.In practice,it can effectively promote green production and green certification of the agricultural supply chain,effectively guarantee the quality and safety of agricultural products,and reduce environmental pollution.Therefore,this dissertation has important theoretical significance and application value for the realization of security and green operation of sustainable agricultural supply chain.