| With the development of e-commerce,logistics service has gradually become an important means for e-commerce platforms to improve their competitiveness.Many platforms try to establish their own self-run logistics,and the Chinese government has issued corresponding policies to encourage platforms to develop their self-run logistics.However,there are huge operational risks in establishing self-run logistics.Even some mature large e-commerce platforms are also faced with the loss of their logistics sector,and even some e-commerce platforms that have established self-logistics have to give up their self-run logistics because it is difficult to reverse the long-term loss.In view of this,the establishment of self-run logistics for e-commerce platforms is a double-edged sword.In addition,for consumers,despite the convenience of online shopping,the negative impact of the shipping fee on their purchase willingness cannot be ignored.Many online sellers or e-commerce platforms with self-owned stores adopt the free shipping strategy to attract consumers.However,practice has proved that the free shipping strategy has pros and cons.Providing free shipping service to consumers can avoid losing consumers,but it brings high cost pressure to e-commerce platforms.In view of the above realistic background,this paper constructs different supply chain structures,comprehensively utilizes Nash game,Stackelberg game and Hotelling game,and combines numerical simulation to successively study the logistics mode strategy of e-commerce platform,shipping strategy of e-commerce platform(or online retailer)and the internal interaction of the above two strategies.The specific research contents of this paper are as follows.Chapter 3 of this paper,based on the hybrid-selling mode of e-commerce platform,introduces the competition and cooperation relationship between the platform and its registered seller,constructs the Hotelling game model,and studies whether the platform should establish its own self-run logistics,and whether it should share its own logistics service with its registered seller.The results show that under the self-run logistics mode,service sharing is always better than non-service sharing.In addition,in the hybrid-selling mode,only service sharing self-run logistics can achieve a win-win situation between the platform and the seller.The increase of product difference and the improvement of product value can promote the realization of this win-win situation.At the same time,the strategic role of the commission rate is very important to the operational decisions of the platform.A higher commission rate will make the seller more inclined to accept the logistics services provided by the platform,and is conducive to the realization of a win-win situation of the platform’s self-run logistics mode.Finally,in the model expansion,the optimal logistics mode strategy of the platform under the reselling mode and the market mode is discussed respectively,which verifies the robustness of the conclusion in this chapter.In chapter 4,the optimal shipping strategy of e-commerce platforms is studied by constructing an online dual-channel model,considering Stackelberg game and Nash game,and introducing the positive effect of free shipping strategy and the negative effect of calculated shipping strategy into a loss-aversion consumer utility function.The results show that the free shipping strategy is suitable for low-priced products,while the calculated shipping strategy is suitable for high-priced products.In addition,shipping strategies made by e-commerce platforms based on their own profit maximization can achieve a win-win situation between the upstream and downstream of the supply chain.This chapter uses numerical simulation to study the impact of different shipping strategies on consumer surplus and social welfare.The results show that the optimal shipping strategy combination of duopoly e-commerce platforms can not bring consumers the highest consumer surplus,but can achieve the highest social welfare.It is worth noting that,in practice,many e-commerce platforms act as online retailers by starting their self-operated stores,so the conclusions of this chapter also apply to those third-party sellers(i.e.online retailers)who registered in the platform.Chapter 5 of this paper,based on the agency-selling mode(i.e.the market mode)of e-commerce platform,introduces the sensitivity of consumers to shipping charges and constructs the Stackelberg game between the e-commerce platform and its registered seller.The platform first decides whether to establish its self-run logistics,and the seller second decides whether to provide free shipping service to consumers.The research conclusion shows that the registered seller’s choice of shipping strategy only depends on consumers’ sensitivity to the shipping fee and is not affected by the logistics mode,but the platform’s logistics mode strategy is affected by the seller’s shipping strategy.Specifically,when the platform predicts that the seller will choose the free shipping strategy,the platform’s logistics mode strategy is not affected by consumers’ sensitivity,but only depends on the third-party logistics service level.When the platform predicts that the seller will choose the calculated shipping strategy,the platform will give up the establishment of self-run logistics as the sensitivity of consumers increases.This chapter also discusses the win-win area of the platform’s logistics mode strategy and the win-win area of the seller’s shipping strategy,respectively.The results show that:if the optimal strategy of the platform is to establish self-run logistics,then such logistics mode can always achieve a win-win situation;If the optimal strategy of the platform is not to establish self-run logistics,then the third-party logistics mode cannot achieve a win-win situation under the condition that its logistics service level is not high enough.In addition,based on the platform’s strategic choice of logistics mode,the seller’s calculated shipping strategy is unable to achieve a win-win situation under the third-party logistics mode.Finally,this chapter uses sensitivity analysis to draw the following conclusions.The application of free shipping strategy will lead to a price rise under the platform’s self-run logistics mode,but will not lead to a price rise under the third-party logistics mode.Besides,the application of free shipping strategy cannot successfully stimulate consumer demand.In addition,for consumers who are not sensitive to the shipping fee,the platform can provide higher level of logistics services than third-party logistics.By contrast,sensitive consumers can hardly enjoy higher level of services than third-party logistics under self-run logistics mode. |
