| The 2008 financial crisis has aroused great attention to financial risks around the world.Preventing financial risks and strengthening financial supervision have always been placed in an important position by the Chinese government in financial work.As the banking industry is the core of the financial system,commercial banks occupy the dominant position of the banking industry,affecting the development of the real economy,but also an important carrier of macro-control,the accumulation of risks of commercial banks is likely to cause a series of serious social and economic problems.In the face of complex international situation and economic downward pressure,further strengthening risk control of commercial banks is an important content of banking management in the new era.While commercial banks in Europe and the United States were hit hard by the2008 financial crisis,China’s state-owned commercial banks were able to maintain steady profit growth during the crisis.The widespread market failure in the crisis has highlighted the superiority of the socialist macro-control with Chinese characteristics and questioned the laissez-faire economic thought of the West.The stable development of China’s banking industry in the crisis is largely attributed to its unique property nature,that is,the high proportion of state-owned shareholdings.During the financial crisis,bank nationalization also became an important measure used by some western developed countries to rescue the market.Although the state’s implicit guarantee helps to reduce the insolvency risk of commercial banks,the government’s implicit guarantee also reduces the market binding force,causing efficiency problems such as "insider control","principal-agent" and budget soft constraints.The accumulation of low efficiency and non-performing loan ratio will cause new risks.In addition,pure nationalization cannot solve all the problems in the development of banks.The problems of efficiency and risk of Chinese commercial banks have been exposed in the process of economic development.Although state-owned commercial banks have undergone joint-stock reform,joint-stock commercial banks and local commercial banks have also gone public,the modernization of internal governance of commercial banks still needs to be solved,and commercial banks are facing the pressure of further reform.In 2013,the Third Plenary Session of the 18 th CPC Central Committee clearly proposed to "actively develop mixed ownership economy",and further mixed ownership reform of the banking industry was carried out.After the continuous deepening of the mixed ownership reform for nearly a decade,China’s banking industry has formed a diversified ownership structure,especially the stateowned commercial banks and other large and medium-sized banks have initially had the characteristics of mixed ownership governance structure.The internal governance structure of state-owned commercial banks,joint-stock commercial banks and local commercial banks has shown different changes and characteristics along with the hierarchical and classified reform of state-owned enterprises.In the long run,the further deepening of the reform of China’s commercial banks still needs to adhere to stratification and classification.Under the background of the reduction of state-owned shareholdings in the mixed ownership reform of state-owned enterprises,many statecontrolled banks have also made new attempts in the ownership structure when introducing private capital and exploring the integration of state-owned shareholdings and private shareholdings.The shareholding form of state-owned shareholdings of commercial banks is constantly changing with the promotion of mixed ownership reform.Therefore,it is necessary to deeply study the influence of state-owned shareholdings on the risk of different types of commercial banks.Further deepening the reform of China’s commercial banks has been included in China’s 14 th Five-Year Plan strategy.The current international environment is more complex,and continued downward pressure on the economy has increased uncertainties in development.Along with the mixed ownership reform of our country to deepen further,it is necessary under the premise of fully considering risk factors,to study the influence of shareholdings ownership ratio in different types of commercial banks in China,analysis of the two types of state-owned shareholdings in the country and the role of the state-owned legal person share,From the perspective of shareholdings checks and balances,it further explores the reasonable development path of state-owned shareholdings under the condition that the largest shareholder is not state-owned,providing theoretical basis for the deepening reform of Chinese commercial banks.The study of this paper is not only helpful to clarify the path of further reform of commercial banks,promote the state-owned capital to better achieve the balance between "social attributes" and "economic attributes",promote the balanced and healthy development of Chinese commercial banks,but also can provide data and theoretical support for the realization of China’s financial security and even economic security.Based on the above background,this paper chooses insolvency risk and credit risk as the research objects among various commercial bank risks on the basis of existing theories,tracks the change characteristics of equity and two types of risks of different types of commercial banks in China after the financial crisis,and deeply analyzes the heterogeneity of the influence of state-owned shareholdings on the insolvency risk and credit risk of different types of commercial banks.The main conclusions are as follows:First,on the basis of carefully combing related literature on bank insolvency risk,credit risk and state-owned shareholdings,a series of theoretical hypotheses are established that state-owned shareholdings have heterogeneity on the insolvency risk and credit risk of different types of commercial banks.Semi-annual data of 35 listed commercial banks in China from 2008 to 2020 are selected as samples for empirical analysis.The results show that: In the state-owned commercial banks,the increase of state-owned shareholdings can reduce the risk of insolvency but also improve the credit risk.In the local commercial banks,increasing the proportion of state-owned shareholdings can significantly reduce the credit risk but does not affect the insolvency risk.For joint-stock commercial banks,when the proportion of state-owned shareholdings is lower than or equal to a specific threshold value,state-owned shareholdings significantly reduce the insolvency risk,but increases the credit risk;when the proportion of state-owned shareholdings is higher than the threshold value,the increase of state-owned shareholdings will improve the credit risk but not affect the insolvency risk.Further considering the moderating effect of capital adequacy ratio on the influence of state-owned shareholdings on credit risk,the results show that: in jointstock commercial banks,increasing capital adequacy ratio will strengthen the role of state-owned shareholdings ratio in intensifying credit risk;In the state-owned commercial banks,increasing the capital adequacy ratio can reduce the role of stateowned shareholdings ratio in improving credit risk.In local commercial banks,the increase of capital adequacy ratio will weaken the role of state-owned shareholdings ratio in reducing credit risk.Second,it discusses how the state-owned shareholdings should exist relative to the risk in different types of commercial banks.State-owned shareholdings can be divided into two forms: state shareholdings and state-owned legal person shareholdings.On the basis of relevant studies,the theoretical hypothesis that state shareholdings and state-owned legal person shareholdings affect the insolvency risk and credit risk of different types of commercial banks is constructed,and the semi-annual data of 35 listed commercial banks in China from 2008 to 2020 are selected as samples for empirical analysis.The results show that the state shareholdings of state-owned commercial banks can increase the credit risk,while the state legal person shareholdings can reduce the insolvency risk without affecting the credit risk.In jointstock commercial banks,state-owned shareholdings exist in the form of state-owned legal person shareholdings,which is better than the form of state shareholdings,although it brings the dilemma that insolvency risk and credit risk cannot be reduced at the same time.In local commercial banks,the state shareholdings should exist in the form of state-owned legal person shareholdings,the increase of state-owned legal person shareholdings can play a role in reducing credit risk,while not affecting the insolvency risk.Further considering the regulating effect of capital adequacy ratio,it is found that in state-owned commercial banks,increasing capital adequacy ratio can reduce the effect of national shareholdings on raising credit risk.In joint-stock commercial banks,increasing capital adequacy ratio will intensify the role of stateowned legal person shareholdings in improving credit risk.In local commercial banks,increasing capital adequacy ratio will weaken the role of state-owned legal person shareholdings in reducing credit risk.Third,considering that in the deepening of mixed ownership reform,many stateowned commercial banks gave up their position as the largest shareholder,and the largest shareholder changed from state-owned to non-state-owned,and some commercial banks maintained the non-state-owned status of the largest shareholder throughout the sample period.In order to explore the reasonable change direction of state-owned shareholdings under the condition that the state-owned shareholdings of commercial banks give up the status of the largest shareholder,this paper studies the influence of state-owned shareholdings on the insolvency risk and credit risk of different types of commercial banks under the condition that the largest shareholder is not state-owned.From the perspective of shareholdings checks and balances,this paper analyzes the situation where the largest shareholder is not state-owned.How should the state-owned shareholdings of commercial banks be adjusted to reduce the risk of insolvency and credit risk? On the basis of the theoretical analysis,the empirical analysis takes the data of joint-stock commercial banks and local commercial banks from 2008 to 2020 as the sample.The results show that in joint-stock commercial banks,non-state ownership of the largest shareholder of commercial banks can significantly increase the risk of insolvency,but it can also reduce the credit risk.In the local commercial banks,the non-state-owned shareholder has no significant influence on the credit risk,but it can significantly improve the insolvency risk.Further,if the largest shareholder of commercial banks has been non-state-owned,increasing state-owned shareholdings can significantly reduce the credit risk of commercial banks and mitigate the positive impact of non-state-owned largest shareholder on the insolvency risk of commercial banks.However,if the largest shareholder is non-state-owned,However,the proportion of state-owned shareholdings is always too low to form an effective check and balance with private shareholdings,so state-owned shareholdings cannot play its regulating role.Based on the above conclusions,this paper puts forward policy suggestions for different types of commercial banks: In the state-owned commercial banks,increasing the proportion of state-owned shareholdings will make the banks face the balance between insolvency risk and credit risk.Therefore,the overall proportion of stateowned shareholdings should not be reduced blindly,but the state-owned shareholdings can be considered to exist in the form of state-owned legal person shareholdings rather than state shareholdings,and at the same time,the capital adequacy ratio of state-owned commercial banks can be moderately improved to inhibit the role of state-owned shareholdings in improving credit risk.For joint-stock commercial banks,when the proportion of state-owned shareholdings is lower than or equal to the threshold value,the adjustment of the proportion of state-owned shareholdings will face the balance of two kinds of risks,because the proportion of state-owned shareholdings will be adjusted according to the bank’s own risk situation,and when the proportion of stateowned shareholdings is higher than the threshold value,although the increase of the proportion of state-owned shareholdings will not affect the insolvency risk but will improve the bank’s credit risk.Therefore,we can moderately reduce the proportion of state-owned shareholdings.In order to restrict state-owned shareholdings to improve the role of credit risk should be moderately reduced asset adequacy ratio.The existence of state-owned shareholdings in the form of state-owned legal person shareholdings is better than that of state shareholdings.Non-state ownership as the largest shareholder can significantly improve the insolvency risk of joint-stock commercial banks,but it can also play a role in reducing credit risk.When the first major shareholder of jointstock banks is non-state-owned,the excessively low proportion of state-owned shareholdings cannot form an effective check and balance with non-state-owned shareholdings and thus play a role in reducing the two types of risks.Therefore,the proportion of state-owned shareholdings should be increased.In local commercial banks,increasing the proportion of state-owned shareholdings can significantly reduce the credit risk and does not affect the insolvency risk.Therefore,local commercial banks should moderately increase the proportion of state-owned shareholdings.Stateowned shareholdings should exist in the form of state-owned legal person shareholdings,and the largest shareholder had better be state-owned shareholdings.In order to strengthen the role of state-owned shareholdings ratio in reducing credit risk,the asset adequacy ratio of local commercial banks should be reduced. |
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