Research On The Corporate Governance Of Joint-stock SOEs Of China

By adopting theoretical and empirical methods in the framework of modern corporate governance theories, the author carefully analyzes the governance of joint-stock SQEs and offers novel explanations to the salient problems existing in the governal of China joint-stock SOEs such as the abnormality of structure of stock right; the weakling function of the board of directors; the unreasonable structure of investors; the rent-seeking to power; the lack of efficient binding of market competition; the information traps; the shady deal of re-construction ; and the problems involving both the new and old hree corporate committees For the problems listed above, after careful learning of the typical corporate governance mode abroad and their experience in state-owned enterprises corporate governance, the thesis proffers the basic countermeasures to improve the corporate governance of joint-stock SOEs in our country, of which the main points can be summarized as below: To decentralize the stated-owned stock right to optimize the structure of the stock right; To reconstruct the board of directors to strengthen its independence; To adopt original thinking to develop investors of organization unconventionally; To stratify powers of the three new and old corporate committees respectively; To amplify the law systems, and to improve the mechanism of external governance.