The Incentive And Constraint Mechanismof To The Managers Of State-Owned Commercial Banks In China

It is an inevitable course to set up and apply the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks in our country, as the market-oriented economical transition process. What my article expanded is: under the condition proceed, how to set up a rational incentive and compatible constraint mechanism to the exacting of state-owned commercial banks, which can be applied and in line with the treads of international best practice. As to the state-owned commercial banks with vitality, the incentive and constraint mechanism should solve four problems at lest: (1) how to make the capable managers be able to give full play to their managerial abilities and the persons without genuine talent be recognizable and eliminated quickly ；(2) The owners can obtain effective authority to supervise managers behavior and their performance in the process of their shifting the right to the managers. While the managers have to accept the owners' strict supervision after obtaining managerial power； (3)According to the demand of the managers of state-owned commercial banks, make their award and shareholders' interests to reaches the direct radio relation, and make the managers' decision about long-term development of state-owned commercial banks accordance with the shareholders' will；(4) A strict scientific target accout-ability systems of the managers must take strategy implementation as the direction, can carry on the scientific examination, and adheres to the principles of " openness, fairness and honesty"。 Based on the incentive viewpoints and the theory of the transaction cost, I introduce that the managers of state-owned commercial banks should be motivated and restricted in a way. Through comparing the system of managers' singling out, motivation and restriction in America, Japan and China, we should establish and complete the mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks . Thinking about present condition of our state-owned commercial banks, the present the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers and mal-loan coefficient, to establish and complete the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks . How to establish and complete the incentive and constraint systems to managers of state-owned commercial banks in terms of the presentcondition of managers of our state-owned commercial banks. On the grounds of my theory basis which I attained during my studying and my experience from working, I will replenish the theory of the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks in my article:1,In America, managers are subject to high level of incentive but at the same time they are restricted so little that financial scandals turn up. In terms of this phenomenon, I define a function of operator's efficiency: P=f(M*β+N*α)*Ab (β+α=1)(N is the level of restriction) I do not approve the other function: P=f(M*Ab).2,I establish synthetic model of the incentive and constraint on basis of Lauren's model.3,In accordance with mal-loan coefficient, I establish the incentive constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks and find the point which connects the incentive and constraint to managers of varying state-owned commercial banks.4,I expound we should establish the incentive and constraint mechanism to the managers of state-owned commercial banks on the grounds of varying circumstance, should not make it rigidly uniform.