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An Analysis On Incentive Mechanism And Payment Model For PLA's Logistic Officers

Posted on:2004-03-06Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:J F ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2156360095962921Subject:Agricultural Economics and Management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
While playing its significant role, the modern military logistics is in possession of large quantities of military and economic resources. Logistic officers, the conductors of rear services, exercise the power of operation without the ownership power. The separation of the two powers decides the conflicts between logistic officers' behaviors and people's expectations. Thus, how to set up an effective incentive mechanism in the light of salary and others, so as to increase logistic cadres' personal performance and enhance military economic profits, becomes one of the core problems for logistic human resources management.Based on humanistic management theory, traditional incentive theory, principal-agent theory, and the relevant forefront economic and management theories, and set in a background of the practice of personnel management systems of the government and enterprises in China and abroad and the practice of the Chinese military officers' management system, this paper sheds new light on the recreation of incentive from a new perspective by putting officers' salary incentive problem into a principal-agent relation. The author, with a comprehensive study method combining comparative study with quantitative analysis and qualitative analysis, and positive study with standardized study, starts from the scientific definition of incentive mechanism, creates an analytical environment for incentive mechanism, conducts an all-round humanistic study on logistic cadres, forwards a hypothesis of humanity of 'satisfying-human', and further examines the theory. Then the paper ushers in the principal-agent problem of the army, focuses on the logistic cadres' salary-incentive model and alternative material-incentive schemes under this model in an information asymmetry condition, and calculates an optimum solution by model-parameter and scheme-optimization. At last, an incentive-mechanism improvement conception is presented.In brief, the paper attempts to introduce and instill the modem management theories into the traditional military cadres' management system, so as to contribute to the incentive theory and practice of the army.
Keywords/Search Tags:Logistic Officer, Incentive, Salary-incentive, the Hypothesis of Humanity, Asymmetry of Information, Principal-agent Relation, the Problem of Agent in the Army
PDF Full Text Request
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