Principal-agent Relation Studies Of State-owned Commercial Bank

Principal - agent relation studies of state-owned commercial bankPrincipal-agency in modern enterprise system shows that the separation of enterpriser and manager ( having changed into Principal person and agent ) has created separating of power which the surplus to be come down on and power which surplus control. asymmetric information at the same time because between enterpriser and manager include that asymmetry before the event result in retrorse selection and asymmetry after the event produce the question of morality namely owing to information asymmetric call to make that the client of enterprise is faced with principals - the acting on behalf of the problem of agent who how to supervise and encourages the enterprise , and solves the payout principals - to act on behalf of the problem agency cost.Moreover the enterprise is the corps activity , and hard owing to defines everyone contribution respectively very much , and can give rise to " loafs on the job the problem " . and the proprietary rights belongs all the people in the state-owned commercial bank , but without the concrete individual or juridical person, and who can not undertake any loss duty yet , "proprietors' a vacant position " is appeared At the same time , agent can have the aid of the information superiority for self maximize interest and sacrifice client's interest , and the alienation of this kind of objective embarrasses client to know very much , this has been a formation " inside person's control " . And how the state-owned commercial bank is multilayer principals acting on behalf of, and the long excessively principals - acts on behalf of the chain , and makes to perform practically no function to the restriction of agent . In order to urge the objective of agent is approach to objective of client , and achieving the enterprise value' maximize , and also guarantees the interest of agent self , and builds suitable excitation restriction mechanism looking very important . Encourages in short-term and the long-term excitation combines each other , and that spirit excitation and material encourage grabs together .But law restriction and system restriction etc are included in the restriction . We had joined WTO, and had been faced with competition enlarging increasingly pressure , and it is far away that the state-owned commercial bank reforms , and how the corporation imperfect at present time in administering mechanism dealing with well principal - agent relation, and build to strengthen to encourage restricting mechanism to look very importantFirst, the text conclude some viewpoints of principal-agent theory newly, and introduce principal -agent's characters and three kinds of ways of cost are acted on behalf of in aspect and content of subject and object, three kinds mould and reduction Then has analyzed the effect in the capital market of state-owned commercial bank , and makes us can understand the state-owned commercial bank indeed is in the capital market what cultivates land the bit, thecause of " client is short of to lose " that there from we can find so-called Next having analyzed information incorrectly calls the influence to the state-owned commercial bank , has given rise to against the selection in direction and has lost moral integrity for and principals acting on behalf of the problem And then has analyzed government and alphabet length , higher level's alphabet length and lower level alphabet length , alphabet length and enterprise manager , depositor and this four kinds of businesses of alphabet length , makes we in following the business course more profoundly belonging to the nation commercial bank of understanding all person a vacant position and management objective alienation , internal person's controls and the moral risk and outside the agency chain grown , " ratchet effect" and the cost overflows , simple has soon afterwards given out some views to these problems Having built soon afterwards one entrusts - acts on behalf of model and his to expand the model, and making us to entrusting - and the agency problem has had...