The Principle Of Ultimate Ownership, Ownership Structure And Corporate Performance

Ownership structure of listed companies is very important component of corporate governance. This paper firstly deeply analyzes the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies. The result shows that the traditional classification of ownership structure has some drawback. It can't objectively reflect how government controls listed companies. Based on the analyses above, this paper reclassification the ownership structure of Chinese listed companies according to the principle of ultimate ownership, then empirical studies how ownership structure of listed companies influences corporate performance from such two angles: intensive degree of share ownership and ultimate shareholders' property. The empirical result shows: (1) The way how the state controls listed companies has developed to indirect controlling featured as pyramid shareholding schemes, and such pyramid shareholding schemes is very common in Chinese listed companies. (2) Chinese listed companies' ownership is high concentrated and the regression parameter between intensive degree of share ownership and corporate performance is significant. (3) In the mixed sample and the electronic industry sample, the proportion of state-ultimate-owned share and non-state-ultimate-owned share significantly related to corporate performance. But in the sample of public utilities industry and business industry, there is no significant correlation ship between ownership structure and corporate performance. This paper also compares and analyses the performance of state-ultimate-controlled listed companies and non-state-ultimate-controlled listed companies. On the base of the amylase above, this paper gives some corresponding policies and suggestions.