A Research Of Managers' Incentive Mechanism Of Shan Dong Tian Yuan Construction Group

The reforming aim of China's state-owned enterprise is to establish a modern enterprise system that is "distinct property right, derinote right and responsibility, Separate government and enterprise and scientific management." After more than twenty years gradual economic reform for exploring the orientation and way of the state owned enterprise reform, the state-owned enterprise reform has got to such a stage that its focal point is to seek the reforming breakthrough point by specifically sowing various difficult problems. The incentive problem of the state-owned enterprise's managers are the key one that the state-owned enterprise reform faces and the solution of this problem maybe is the important breakthrough point of the reform. Therefore the study of the incentive problem of the state-owned enterprise's managers has important theoretical significance and practical value.First, from economics and management point of view, the thesis analyses the theoretical basis of the managers' incentive mechanism and the State-owned enterprise's managers' human nature, needs, incentive factors, utility, which becomes the basic standpoint of the incentive problem of Shan dong tian yuan construction group's management. Secondly, according the incentive factors, the thesis analyses the managers' substance incentive and spirit incentive mechanism of Shan dong tian yuan construction group, finds the current problems. Thirdly, using the Theory of Principal-Agent in Game Theory, the thesis builds two models, the model of contract cardinals (objective profits) and the model of the sharing of surplus profits, and also gibes an example to discuss, and then draws a useful conclusion which is confirmed through example of Shan dong tian yuan construction group afterwards. Finally, the thesis gives advices to execute the incentive mechanism of Shan dong tian yuan construction group.The thesis combines the reality of incentive on the China's state-owned enterprise's managers and applies relevant theoretical knowledge of economics and management. It has some theoretical significance and practical guiding meaning. It is hoped to help the study of the incentive problem of the state-owned enterprise's managers.