Game Theoretical Approach To Public Crisis Management And Studies Of Counterplan

Under the influence of globalization and with the ongoing social revolution, China is transforming in all respects and encountering crisis. Thus, public crisis management became a key project for Chinese government and our society. Based on the analysis of present status, features, and causes of public crisis, the thesis firstly brings out the necessity of constructing public crisis management system. Then, the theoretical research and historical background in western countries as well as the present status in China are introduced. Next, the definition, cause, category, feature of crisis and that of public crisis management are brought under discussion. In this thesis, the author tentatively makes an account of public crisis management within the framework of Game Theory, which is a new field never tried before. Basic ideas of Game Theory are presented and the framework of the Game-theoretic account of public crisis management is provided in comparison with that of traditional models.The first theory adopted in analysis of solving public crisis management is prisoners' dilemma model, which is the modeling of conflicts between senses of individual and collectivity. The author provided methods of solution as follows: Payoff improvement, repeated games and rule compulsory. Various problems of prisoners' dilemma are taken under discussion while taking SARS as instance. And measures of breaking prisoners' dilemma comprise: construction of logical civil interrelationship among the governments; innovation of staff management system and government contribution evaluating system; perfection of the responsibility institution and founding government of obligation.The second theory mentioned in the research is the theory of principal-anent. Players of crisis as central government, local citizens and local governments are distinguished as principles or agents. And model analysis of the agents (local government) is carried out basing on its pay-off matrix. The author provides institutional measures for local governments to participation constraint and incentive-compatibility constraint. The agent's participation constraint is investigated as well.The effective measure of dealing with public crisis management is to set up management systems, which is the key point of the author. Enlightened by the Game Theory, the author begins with new institutional economics and proposes the foundation and innovation of public crisis management system. The Game-theoretic model of crisis evolution is set up and institutional design is made for the system of public crisis management. However, social security cannot be guaranteed simply by the foundation of public crisis management system. Eternal safety relies in the optimization of public administration institution.