On Strengthening & Standardization Of Check On Revenue Under The Situation Of Information Asymmetry

The information asymmetry is a ubiquitous economic phenomenon in the realistic economic activity. In the tax collection and management activity, it includes external and internal ones, showing as the taxpayer and tax collector have private information to some extents. The behavior of taxpayer's evasion and tax collectors' enforcement against rules and regulations repeatedly occurs. For this reason, our country advances the reform of tax collection and administration with great exertion. It's planned to try hard to alleviate the problem of information asymmetry through propaganda and quickening the speed of the construction of informationization and strengthening check on tax, etc. Though the check on tax revenue, as an important means, has played a positive role in solving the problem of the information asymmetry, yet, at present, there still exists some problems in the practice of tax revenue. It is weak in theoretical foundation, indistinct in the check on revenue; related policies cannot be carried out completely; taxpayers have unsettled expectancy. And the tax collectors are assessed mainly on the total revenue, thus the incentive mechanism is not scientific. This article tries to use the theory of information asymmetry, analyse the game in tax revenue, and to further put forward train of thought and idea in strengthening and standardizing the check on tax revenue in terms of economics, that is, to ensure taxpayers to have the right to participate in policy, construct and improve 'game' mechanism; rely on construction of IT to achieve the objective of the check on tax revenue; establish and perfect the protection system of the administration of justice and strengthen the deterrent force in check on tax revenue; establish evaluation system of check on tax revenue, give play to the role of reputation mechanism; construct the scientific internal management mechanism and to achieve 'compatible incentive'.