Political Game And Interests Integration Of Resource-based Rural

Villager autonomy as a form of rural grass-roots democracy, it formed in a certain social background and in particular villages. Actually , China's rural villagers autonomy is a different type of political game at present, resource-based rural villagers' committee elections especially intense competition because a large number of electoral disputes. Resource-based rural election disputes mostly originated from property ownership fuzzy natural resources, rural cadres damage the interests of villagers, this ultimate threat to the stability and development of rural areas.A case study of the sixth election of villagers' committee in village L, shanxi province. This paper though game theory, and resource-based rural villagers' communities will be divided into three field: political domain, the shared resources domain and social exchange domain. At first, the three field are separate analysised, and then use of a simple model to analyze three field interaction. Resource-based rural election disputes can be summarized as follows: in the political domain, as villager autonomy alienation of autonomy for the village committee, the villagers tend to vote on how village cadres management public resources and bring to them immediate interests. In the shared resources domain, owning to collective resources property defects, the village cadres operating public resources be difficult to supervised and restrainted. Then, the two jurisdiction domains formation of an incomplete balanced system, the village cadres affected villagers strategy choices (voting), but the villagers constraints village cadres are difficult. Therefore, as long as village cadres have sufficient capacity to coordinate their own behavior parameters of the existing system balanced villages will change. Joined the social exchange domain association game, we found that, as village cadres management collective resources to conduct effective constraints, which can be used in the political domain powers will be shared resources domain of collective resources into their own community capital, so that the existing system was finally break. During this process, the villagers trust and personal commitment have an impact on equilibrium changes. In Concluded that, villages of resources achieve the new system balanced, it must start with the issue of collective property rights, the establishment of community cooperative shareholding syste, perfect villager autonomy.By analyzing the resources of the election disputes in rural areas, we can clearly found that in the resource-based rural social transformation, expanding the gap between the interests, the interests of public expression and the interests of complex relationships, or that China's rural society entered the times of "interests game". In the resource-based rural areas, the villagers' committee does not have the people's commune system powers that totally dominate and control the functions of the interests of the community resources, but in the process of social transformation in rural areas, village committees still have a certain amount of community interests and the allocation of resources. Villagers' committee will be still in the center of the structure in the interests of rural communities, is the main an important place of"nterests Game".The villagers' committees election of Resource-based rural areas concentrate on the performance of the villagers for rural public power. With the emergence of divided interests, this political conflict strongly affect the resources of the rural community relations adjustments and reorganization. Rational political system should be regulated political groups, its political energy effectively integrated into the sustainable development goals. Therefore, coordinating conflict interests, building a harmonious social are the key in resource-based rural areas.