Game Theoretical Studies On Governments In Constructing The Interest Pattern For Harmonious Society

In recent years, social unharmonious conditions become more serious. The reason is the real social interest pattern can't effectively regulate complex interest relations among different interest groups, reconstructing the interest pattern becomes the inevitably mission of constructing socialist harmonious society. Based on governments'special status, this paper will highlight and study in game theory interest relations existing in the governments system and make it clear that governments' function is to instruct the building of balanced interest pattern.First, the paper limits the research scale of governments in interest pattern, including interest relations existing in the governments system and governments'role and responsibilities in reconstructing the interest pattern, followed by building the analysis system using game theory.Then regarding the ineffective execution of public policies as an induction, the paper studies different interest dilemmas like contribution game dilemma between central and local governments and common area dilemmas among local governments, all of these are taken for causes of governments' interest conflicts. In order to break the dilemmas, on the basis of decentralization degree that the central government granting to local governments, the paper presents two system arrangements including to build the bargain model between the central and local governments to balance the public policies and to introduce reputation model helping the central government establish its particular reputation so that local governments would chose to cooperate with the central government under the threat of this reputation.Though the dilemmas are breaking, the central and local governments are still in a kind of nervous game relation, therefore the paper will further study the central and local governments' interest relationship based on principal-agent relation, and the conclusion is the key for local governments to carry out excellent governance lies in they take risk neutral attitude to decision,while institutional public participation and the central government' reasonable mechanism design can both change the local governments' risk attitude from aversion to neutral, consequently realize the harmonious relationship between the central and local governments.Straightening out the central and local governments' interest relationship is a basic desirable precondition, the standing point of the paper remains with that governments have to concentrate on being the designer of systems, and lead the construction of interest pattern by offering the feasible systems arrangements and distributing social resources in reason.