Research On The Inspiration And Constraint Mechanism For The Public Universities' Administrators Based On The Principal-Agency Theory

As a main medium for the higher education, the public universities play a leading role. For a long time,the public universities has been being managed as a cause of public good ,forming a administrative mode, which is typical for the fact that they are solely funded by government ,and exclusively administrated according to a unified plan. Consequently, the mode is characterized by the serious administrative bureaucracy, the severe lack of inspiration and constraint mechanism and the inefficient distribution of educational resources.Modern economics has already found that efficiency not only stems from the inspiration and constraint caused by market competition, but also from those by the interior organization. The administrators of a university can be regarded as the core and soul of its development. The function and significance of them has great influence on its development. Thus, to establish a reasonable inspiration and constraint system for them will be helpful to inspire their enthusiasm and constraint them from illegal action, improve the administrative efficiency of the public universities. However, a lot of problems have risen up either due to the negligence of the truth or to the failure of arranging the system.From the 1970s, the Principal-Agency theory based on information economics has been putting the research emphasis on the principal's inspiration and constraint mechanism for the agent, on reducing the Principal cost as well as increasing the profits. Based on the Principal-Agency Theory and the Game Theory, my research of this thesis adopted the methodology of economics. Through analyzing the theoretic mode, the author designed a mechanism which can both inspire and constraint the administrators of the public universities .Thus, the deputies (i.e. the administrators of the public universities) would act in accordance with the benefits of the consigner maximizing the educational profits.The thesis consisted of six chapters. In the chapter one, this article introduced the background information and methods for this study, as well as the definitions of the concepts concerned. Chapter two provided the theoretic foundation and several hypotheses concerning the inspiration and constraint mechanism. Applying the Principal-Agency Theory, chapter three analyzes the current situation of the public universities. Chapter four presented the typical current situation of the administrators'actions in Chinese public universities. Chapter five analyzed the inspiration and constraint mode for public universities'administrators based on the Game theory in detail. In the final chapter, conclusions and several suggestions are made according to the mode.