Study On University Etrance Mechanism In China Based On Two-sided Matching Theory

Economic resources allocation is often not in one step, and it is a constantly choosing and decision-making matching process among various departments, the number and rate of resource flow is the embodiment of economic efficiency, the theory that study matching mechanism among participants within the same or different set is matching theory, a new branch of economics .The research on matching theory can be dated to Gale and Shapley. It mainly includes the existence of a stable matching, the structure of stable matching set, participant's behavior strategie and matching algorithm. Matching theory has a wide range of application in the allocation of public resource (such as enrollment issue) and market design, etc. At the aspect of theory, one to one and many to one matching theory has formed the unified and standardized theory system, but research on many to many matching is still at the exploratory stage, a lot of research field is far from mature. In china, research on matching theory, neither theoretical nor applied research, is still at early stage , it is lack of researchers and relative literature, thus the introduction of two-sided matching theory has important theoretical and practical significance.University entrance examination has a profound impact on our society. It is an important process through which country choses talented people and individuals pursue their goals. The university entrance mechanism has run for decades, with the number of candidates and colleges increases year by year , university entrance problem is becoming more and more complex, thus, the accurately describnation of the university entrance problem, the objective evaluation ,the analysis on the efficiency and the fairness characteristics and the improvent of the mechanism are particularly important .Entrance mechanism can be seen as a kind of education resources matching, it is equivalent to the matching problem which does not take into account the welfare of university. Based on this idea, from the perspective of resource allocation, this paper firstly analyses the information environment, the competitive and decision-making process of the candidates under university entrance mechanism, and reveal the similar consistency of preference and priority features under university entrance environment ,then analyses the behavior of preferences reveal games under different information environment, and show the impact of information environment on the allocation efficiency of university entrance mechanism and the dependency of university entrance mechanism to the information environment, At last, based on the above discussion ,this paper analyses the advantages and problems of parallel preference, proposes an innovation idea about the parallel preference entrance mechanism under imperfect information, and proves some excellent properties of the innovative entrance mechanism, such as fairness, strategic proof , no waste , pareto efficiency and avoid of high score bad admission.Through our research,this paper draws conclusions on information environment and mechanism of college entrance and improvement in college entrance mechanism as follows : First of all, college entrance mechanism has approximately the same preference and priority structure; Secondly, college entrance mechanism has excellent property when the preference and priority structure are all the same, but, under incomplete information condition,it will be tactful ;The last one is under incomplete information condition ,the improved mechanism also has good property.