Design Of College Entrance Examination Admission Mechanism Based On Mixed Strategy

College entrance examination admission mechanism plays a vital role in the whole college entrance examination.Since its establishment,college entrance examination admission system has undergone several revisions and changes,but there are still some obvious drawbacks,such as "high scores and low records" and "high scores fail to take the list" and so on.The establishment of an effective college entrance examination admission mechanism is a great event for the benefit of the people and the country.In this paper,a general model of admission mechanism is given.A better admission mechanism should satisfy the three characteristics of individual rationality,Pareto effectiveness and anti-manipulation.The function of satisfaction between school and student is defined to measure the quality of admission mechanism.In the third chapter,the advantages and disadvantages of the existing enrollment mechanism has been analyzed and compared.The parallel results obtained through the same concrete example are better than the voluntary priority system in improving the "high scores" ability and the school's full clothing.In terms of the comparison of the first voluntary admission rate,the voluntary priority system is better than parallel volunteerism.In the fourth chapter,the design of college entrance examination admission mechanism based on mixed strategy is proposed.Three college entrance examination admission mechanisms of "optimal major","optimal school" and "mixed preference"were proposed.By sorting the preferences of "professional priority" students under the three mechanisms and use TTC algorithm to complete the match.Comparing the preference results of the same instance under the admission mechanism of three mixed strategies to explain that this mechanism has individual rationality and this mechanism has individual rationality,pareto effectiveness and anti-manipulability,and high satisfaction.