"Self - Consciousness" In The Transcendental Deduction Of "purely Rational Criticism"

“Self-consciousness” is one of Kant’s key concepts in hisCritique of Pure Reason. In conducting a new version of thetranscendental deduction of categories in the second edition ofCritique, Kant highlights the priority of “Self-consciousness” as aresponse to criticisms of “psychologism” generated after his firstedition of Critique is published, thus laying the foundation for histranscendental philosophy, of which the goal is to seek the a prioriground for human cognition. The methodology of this dissertation ischaracterized by my introduction of analytic philosophers’ approachto Kant’s argument and then continental philosophers’ defense.My dissertation consists of three parts. The first part gives abrief introduction to “Self-consciousness” in two regards, thebackground of “self-consciousness” as a response to empiricists suchas Hume and the two paradoxes of it, precisely, is“self-consciousness” better understood as an actuality or a capacityand the innate contradiction between self-consciousness andcategories, especially in the second edition. The second part mainlyfocuses on distinguishing three similar terms,“Self-consciousness”,“Transcendental Apperception” and “I think” by way of referring toRatke’s Handlexikon, hoping to demonstrate Kant’s points ofemphasis in his usage of these terms and the possible theoreticalproblems we might encounter in his argument. The third part is achief effort to handle the problems of “Self-consciousness” withGuyer’s analysis on the contradiction between “Self-consciousness” and categories as well as the difficulty of “Self-consciousness” in itssplitting into subject and object. Then I would channel Pierre Keller’sview on the contradiction between “Self-consciousness” andcategories before transferring to the topic of the property of“Self-consciousness” discussed by continental philosophers such asHenrich, Windelband and Hinsch, most of whom point out themetaphysical evidence (Evidenz) of “Self-consciousness”. The fourthpart is a sketch of the development of Kant’s “Self-consciousness” inGerman Idealism. My dissertation ends with a summary of theparadoxical characters and the failure of “Self-consciousness” in thedomain of theory of knowledge and furthermore, the implication of itin the domain of Kant’s ethics in reference to the debate of Cassiereand Heidegger over Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason.