The Empirical Study On Stock Ownership Incentive Mechanism In China

According to Modern Incentive Theory, Stock Ownership Incentive as a kind of effective incentive system is suitable for the modern enterprise in its development of long term. With regard to the experience in the West, enterprises can benefit a lot from the adoption of the system through generating new capital. In contrast, the incentive system will play an even more important role in the construction of modern enterprise mechanism in China. Taking into account the difference in the environment and ownership of enterprise between China and the West, this thesis is designed to show how the incentive mechanism goes well in China, and what a kind of part it will play in every-day operation of enterprise, by providing concrete examples with analysis? Generally speaking, this thesis is divided into three parts. The first part is focused on the generation of incentive mechanism and its importance for enterprise development on the basis of Bailment-agency theory, Human Resource theory and Enterprise Contract theory, together with an introduction to its characteristics, importance and its implementation in China. The second part intends to provide an exemplification of the data involving in index of profit-capacity and growing-capacity of a listed company. Based on such an analysis, we draw the conclusion about the effectiveness of the Incentive System in the long run. And the last part probes into the existing problems involving in the adoption of the Incentive Mechanism in enterprise, and as a result some resolutions are provided. Meanwhile suggestions are offered to enterprises in Xinjiang on their implementation of the Stock Ownership Incentive.