The Research Of Equity Incentive To The SOE Operators Which Based On The Principal-agent Theory

The separation of proprietary rights from management rights is the primary characteristic of a modern enterprise. However, the operator who owned the management rights or control of the company and shareholders who owned the company proprietary rights have the totally different objective function. In practice, the operator is probably the self-interest behavior, and may throat shareholders' profit, which called the "Agency Problem". One of the most effective and direct means for dealing with the problem is incentive. To achieve the incentive compatibility by designing and operating the incentive mechanism, namely, to achieve all owners' profit by maximizing the operator's profit. Up to now, our state-owned enterprises haven't yet established the sound incentive constraint mechanism, which made the state-owned enterprises' agency problem turn worse and the state-owned assets run off seriously. Thus, to establish an incentive mechanism to the SOE operator, and advance it gradually become a core problem which needs to be worked out in our SOE reform.In western developed countries, the equity incentive mechanism is verified as one of the effective incentive mechanisms to the operator for solving principal-agent problem in the modern enterprises, some Chinese enterprises have made the attempt. However, National specialists and scholars are divided on the validity of the equity incentive mechanism in solving the incentive problem to our SOE operators.This paper is based on principal-agent theory, property rights theory, western incentive theory and human capital theory. It mainly discusses the following contents by description of theory and empirical research:The development and the status quo of the incentive mechanism to our enterprise operators: from the original form, that is, the base pay, the floating wages, bonus, the profit-retaining to the present yearly salary system and the ESO incentive, the incentive way to our operator has been developing through nearly 30 years. But the incentive problem of SOE operators hasn't been solved. The aggregate level of income of operator is low, the salary mechanism is unreasonable, and operators are not satisfied with their pay.Various equity incentive patterns and its effect in China: Analyze eight equity incentive patterns and its characters used in present China. Through the empiricalresearch, we gain the conclusion that there has relativity between the equity incentive mechanism and enterprise achievements, and the equity incentive system has the remarkable incentive effect. Whereas correspond the imperfection of the rules and regulations, the irregular of the stock market and the morbidity of the enterprise's management hierarchy, equity incentive mechanism utilization has bad effect and are limited.A new idea on the equity incentive mechanism to our SOE: analyzed by the game theories, addressed the feasibility of share options implementation in Chinese listed company, and share options can serve the purpose to spur operators work hard. Addressed the foundation, precondition and guarantee for our SOE to implement ESO, and propose the corresponding opinion for improvement. To operators of the non-listed company, we point out a new incentive mode—"Hypothesized stock based on bonus" which combines the short-term incentive means with bonus and the long-term incentive means of ESO, it avoids the risk of stock market.