The Relationship Between The Central And Local Game Behavior Analysis

Since the reform and opening up, China's economy has made remarkable achievement, its transition way also get many scholars being civilized. But behind the unlimited scenery, undercurrent surges: with the deepening of the reform of the central government and local government, the contradictions and conflicts, and this is intensifying academically did not cause enough attention. History study emphasizes, China's economic reform is a bottom-up process of institutional change, namely, the local government forced superior government agreed to change the process, it is the key to the success of China's economic transformation. But with the deepening of the reform of a harmonious picture, scenes don't emerge in front of our central government after many policies, the local government does not implement, but the shuffle, negative execution. Policy, the policy, the two XiaYouDuiCe game into overdrive. In recent years, in the implementation of the scientific outlook on development and take a new road to industrialization, decreasing farmers' burden, according to the minimum price system for buying farmers surplus, maintenance landless peasants rights, can see the central government and local government's game of shadows. And for housing prices since 2005, the more the regulation of the central government and local government game to acme.forward rationalization proposals.The central and local government relations, is an important part of national structure, it mainly includes the central and local economic relations and establish in certain economy based on the central and local political relations. The central and local government relations are the core of the central representative national interest and local representatives between the local interests of benefit equilibrium problems. This form of benefit equilibrium basically has two kinds: one is the form of state structure problems, namely, authorities problem; Second is the purview division of the central and local issues, namely power allocation problem.The central and local interests relation between the core content of constitutes a relationship. In the process of marketization reform, reform strategy and "autonomy and sharing focal points in the new financial system eat" implementation, contributed to the local government relatively independent economic benefit main body status. Central to local government performance evaluation with local government, and continuously pursue will inevitably promote local benefit maximization. This phenomenon by main reason, main is China's political system. The Chinese government system and the structure of local government system of China, the central and local relations are important content, because it relates to administrative division of powers and benefit assignment. This pattern had lasted for a long time, it caused a "YiTouChen", the central excessive centralization, the place has no right to, hampered the development of social economy and culture. After the reform and opening-up policy, the central government began decentralization, local governments have the power, active part of the local economy, promote the national development. The current situation is, local autonomy in receive a portion of, appeared not wagging the dog, consider the local interest, even at the expense of the overall interests phenomenon. This is the problems needing attention.This paper through the study between central and local governments game behavior causes and the analysis of historical development process, especially to the relationship between the central and local economic and political relations, because now caused by relationship between the central and local conflicts of interest is that the key powers devolved and financial centralized authority. In this situation will cause excessive, the central powers devolved financially right still mainly concentrated in the central hands, this voice and property of asymmetric has prompted the game behavior of the central and local occur, place to seek greater property. From our relationship between the central and local development history of finding the general rule of its development and the existing problems, and put forward rational proposals for reform.This paper writing process, the method is used are: 1, this paper adopts history and system research methods, through the study of the development of relationship between the central and local historical process, find the cause of problems. 2, this paper also lots of using comparative study, including longitudinal and transverse comparison. In contrast to the central and local game of positive and negative effects, to make a conclusion, to construct the harmonious relationship between the central and local.This paper is divided into three parts:The first part now game behavior relationship between the central and local situation, can be divided into two phases: before reform and opening up, reform and opening, and now the central government and the local early game, and the problems faced by both the central and local analysis are the causes of the game behavior. The second part from the relationship between the central and local game behavior, both caused by positive effects and negative effects two main aspects, study the main aspects between.The third part, on the basis of the research on relationship between the central and local from existing problems, construct the harmonious relationship between the central and local aspects, summarizes the harmonious relationship between the central and local structural reform, the significance of the content and how it needs to put forward rational Suggestions. Reform...