An Analysis Of Desert In Distributive Justice

Compared with democracy, freedom and equality, desert, as a concept with the same long tradition in the history of political philosophy, does not receive the equal attention in contemporary political philosophy. However, maybe this is not because of its simplicity and being self-evident. Through the exploration of this concept, we can see that it not only refers to a quite complicated knowledge system, but also involves several significant problems in theory of justice.In the exploration of the property of desert, we justify its past-orientation. As a symbol of diachronic fairness, the principle of desert is not what Nozick calls end-result principle but a kind of history principle, which means that desert relies on past condition and people's behavior. As a concept with a three-fold structure, desert refers to interpersonal compare both in its base and object. Possession can only be relative. It is unreasonable to emphasize individual rights too much at the cost of sacrificing sociality. Lockean proviso needs a historical analysis, and cannot be compatible with modest scarcity which is a widely accepted prerequisite in the theory of justice. The normative force of desert does not rely on institution. It is rather a pre-institutional concept. And the justification based on autonomy makes the normative force lie in the value of desert itself.The justification of desert base is the central problem that desert theory is expected to address. The commonsense desert bases, no matter ability, effort, or contribution, are faced with insurmountable difficulties when it comes to justify. In this aspect, Rawls'critic is quite powerful. His anti-desert theory consists of two parts,namely, responsibility theory and individual theory. Rawls introduces the discussion of arbitrariness in his responsibility theory, arguing that properties are assigned to individuals by chance and people's life perspective should not be dominated by arbitrariness. In his individual theory, Rawls further proposes that properties which are assigned by chance are common assets of the whole society. By separating properties from individual thoroughly, Rawls directs the problem to the construction of subject itself. In some sense, Rawls'sharp critic to desert and its bases brings the discussion about desert to a new level. When it comes to the problem of responsibility, any justifiable defense for desert base should tackle the deep paradox between free will and determinism convincingly. At the same time, the vague boundary between experimental subject and transcendent subject make the construction of subject a very difficult problem. All of these not only need further research on desert, but also are probably the problem that the whole theory of justice can not bypass.