Research Of Transaction Relationship Between Pilot Enterprises And Peasants

At present, China has been through the middle phase of industrialization. Non-agricultural industries have become the main sources of the development of national economy, while the agricultural industries have been transferred from industries for material accumulation to the ones for subsidies. But because of rigid fiscal budget constraints, it is anticipated that the growth of fiscal support expenditure for agriculture is limited. So, on the premise of steady growth of fiscal expenditure, government uses financial funds to support pilot enterprises of agricultural industries in order to increase the efficiency of fiscal expenditure. The pilot enterprises have undertaken dual responsibilities-increasing the income of peasants and improving the competitiveness of companies, which could make peasants share the profits of processing agricultural products by linking small farmers and big markets.Taking Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara industry in He'nan Jiyuan for example, this article adopts the methods of field investigation and interview to collect the information (including data) of peasants and the pilot enterprise, and use game theory to analyze the transaction relations between peasants and the pilot enterprise to find out the defects of the present mechanism, as well as the suggestions to overcome these defecs. After conducting the research, it is found that the planting base of Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara has been growing since the year of 2008, when the local government has started to support Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara industry fiscally, and then the income of peasants who have participated in the planting of Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara has been improved. But in the end of 2010, the planting base is sharply reduced, and the production costs of pilot enterprise-Jishi Corporation Ltd.- are greatly increased, which caused the fell of the rate of net assets. To resolve this problem, the article uses game theory to analyze the transaction relations between pilot enterprise and peasants, and it is found that the development of pilot enterprise has stimulated peasants'income, which is weakened by the unstable cooperation relationship caused by monopoly power of pilot enterprise in the market of raw Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara. So, firstly, it is suggested that local government should strengthen the supervision and raise "Rent-seeking"costs on one hand, and on the other hand, new cooperation relationship - the peasants'co-operatives to bolster their bargaining power in the market of raw Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara. Secondly, the peasants themselves should also upgrade their management abilities to guarantee the good quality of Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara. At last, the company could attract peasants to invest in the development of the company to strengthen the relationship between them, which could promote the development of Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara industry. Only in this condition, the sustainable development of Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara industry could possible, which could guarantee government's subsidies for Rabdosia Rubescens (Hemls.) Hara industry to be effective and the peasants'income to rise steadily.