The Outsourcing's Incentive Mechanism Design Of The Fourth Party Logistics

With the development of logistics'economy, the finer division of labour in society and enterprises pursuit core competitiveness,outsouring more and more be used. This factors spawned the fourth party(4pl). 4pl brings new profit source: on the one hand, effective logistics system can greatly reduce costs;on the other hand, this can speed up capital flows to increase capital's operation rate.In a word the fourth party logistics bring huge economic benefits and social benefits.In the present the research of 4pl is still in the initial stage:research mainly focuses on the analysis of concept, to 4pl's outsourcing of incentive mechanism is less,especially for the research which combines incentive theory with fairness preference theory almost blank.This paper refers to the model of Fehr&Schmidt(1999): under the hypothesis of agents(3pl) have fairness preference,this dissertation sets up different models appropriately in the way of combining information economic theory with game theory,in order to study how agents'effort , incentive mechanisms and supervision are affected by the fairness preference of agents;how clients'effort effects the design of incentive mechanism.This research is expected to provide new advices and guidance in outsouring of 4pl.The main conclusions of this paper are as follows:1. In the basic model of static: incentive coefficient is effected by the risk attitude of 3pl and the fluctuation of output.If 3pl the more preference stability, incentive coefficient should be smaller;if 3pl have fairness preference,the more preference fairness, incentive coefficient should be bigger; 3pl optimum effort is decreasing in fairness preference.In the long term static model, the conclusions are basically the same.2.In the model of output is effected by clients'effort: 4pl's effort is decreasing in the self-marginal cost of efforts; the optimal fixed payments is increasing in the self-marginal cost of efforts.3.In the model of supervision and incentive mechanism:3pl's effort is increasing in incentive and supervision;if the supervision is effective,the incentive can be weakened;the supervision is decreasing in 3pls'fairness preference.