Research On The Fourth Party Logistics Incentives Mechanism Based On Outsourcing

With the social development and the diversity of customer needs high-tech. Enterprisesin order to focus on core competencies of product development, had to be outsourcednon-core competencies outside to logistics business. So that you can reduce logistics costsand achieve service quality of the satisfaction of customer needs. Cooperation in the logisticsoutsourcing process involves three entities:the owners, the fourth party logistics serviceproviders, third-party logistics companies. Fourth party logistics service providers as aconnection object plays a key role. This has prompted the fourth party logistics companiesneed rapidly develop. Fourth corporate leadership as a provider of logistics services, bycombining excellent third-party logistics companies, IT service providers and managementconsulting service providers, provide customer assessment, design, development andoperation of integrated supply chain solutions, make the high-efficiency, high efficiency oflogistics services to be realized, to create higher profits value for customers. However, thefourth party logistics service providers act as both agent and principal, will produce someuncertain factors. Such as information asymmetry makes frequent occurrence leads toincreased agency costs. Therefore, this paper mainly through the angle of fourth partylogistics service provider to determine incentives and put forward some suggestions.In this paper, on the view that the quality of logistics services outsourcing process isparticularly important, it can reduce outsourcing costs, they also enhance their credibility,bring added value for both parties. This paper first introduces the theory of fourth partylogistics and agency theories; secondly, use the dual-principal-agent theory to analysis thefirst relationship of multitasking principal-agent. The interests of outsourcing(commissionparty) to rely the action of4PL provider(agent) and design the logistics outsourcingincentives. Make the4PL service providers to maximize their own utility at the same timeand enable enterprises to reduce the cost of outsourcing. By analyzing the game theorybetween outsourcing business and4PL service providers indicate logistics is uncertain.Enhance the quality of indicators can optimize the optimal incentive contract schemes. Thenanalyze the second relationship is dual-principal-agent.4PL service providers (principal) relyon3PL(agent) to achieve interests. Through incentive theory, making3PL contract incentivesfor systematic research. Ensure that3PL enterprises makes4PL service providers needs tomake a favorable behavior and achieve win-win situation, through3PL from the perspective of maximizing their own interests in the contract incentive constraints. Considering the4PLservice providers as a middle power, the owner should optimize incentives to the level of thiseffort,3PL companies should overcome the risk in order to make these parties to shareinformation and reach advantage of incentives under asymmetric information, in order toensure the success of outsourced logistics, so as to achieve the purposes of enhancing thecompetitiveness of enterprises.