Coordination And Incentive Mechanism Of Enterprise Under The Fourth Party Logistics Platform

With the development of globalization and marketization, enterprises are required to outsourcing non-core competencies such as logistics, in the hope of cutting down the cost of logistics operation, reducing investment risk and resource consumption, enhancing market competitiveness and improving customer loyalty and satisfaction. Moreover, appropriate adjustments of logistics industry in which production and circulation are closely bounded with each other are needed as most logistics enterprises in China were transformed from traditional transporting or warehousing factories which are single-function organizations with lower levels. The factories are naturally inadequate to provide higher logistics services when each one depending on itself alone. Therefore, it is inevitable for logistics enterprises to integrate resources in order to take full advantage of logistics facilities, to avoid repetition and excessive investment of logistics, improving the circulation environment as a whole.Through a summary of game theory, logistics services and supply chain management, four part logistics (4PL) and related theory knowledge, the paper analyzes that the3PL has been unable to meet the growing higher expectations of customers under current economic situation. Meanwhile, the capability of4PL in integrating resources effectively is of vital importance for the overall logistics industry in China to reach a higher level. Defining the concept of4PL and analyzing its main participants and operational mode, we have the reasonable operational mode of4PL. Then we refer to the relevant knowledge of supply and demand in micro-economics and game theory to calculate the logistics prices and profits of both sides based on decentralized decision and centralized decision in the case of4PL and3PL respectively. Only if the condition that more revenue are obtained when both sides deciding centrally than deciding separately be satisfied, will both4PL and3PL tend to cooperate. Applying Nash Bargaining in game theory, and we get the distribution benefits proportion of both sides expressed as Nash Bargaining solution accordingly. Finally, the paper studies the incentive mechanism of principal-agent theory of3PL which is responsible for the implementation of specific logistics services. Furthermore, a model is founded on the basis of the principal-agent relations between4PL and3PL, which aims to make a comparison of the linear incentive contracts on the condition of symmetric and asymmetric information respectively, having a further discussion of risk aversion factor and market uncertainties. The ideas and results are in line with the actual requirements of current logistics industry in China, and are significant and valuable for the future collaboration of3PL and4PL.