Study On Industrial Generic Technology R&D Cooperation Organization And Its Operating Mechanism

Industrial generic technology is likely to be widely used in the present or future in many areas. It's R&D results can be shared and have a depth of a class of technology to the entire industry or more of the industry and its enterprises. Industrial generic technology has the following features: basic, external, risk, relevance, quasi-public character, economic and social benefits and so on. The generic technology has the basic characteristics and specific properties of public goods may lead to market failure and the organizational failures. This double failure determines the government should play a unique role in supply and diffusion of generic technology. It exist the cooperation and competition in the process of generic technology research and development. To a large extent, the role of government is to choose the organization mode of generic technology. Through the rational organization model, the results of scientific research can be fully shared, and the technological achievements can be part of the share. Base on the above available, this study has important significance to R&D model of generic technology and government guidance on the role of organizational model.The first two chapters described the status of domestic and foreign research about generic technology and its R&D organization model. It also described the basic issues of generic technologies, such as the concept, characteristics, identification, double failures phenomena. Chapter three construction of the generic technology R&D organization model, which provides a theoretical basis for the government to guide the rational organizational model. In this paper, the model draws Kaz Miyagiwa, Yuka ohno's two-stage duopoly game model. We made improvements for the existing research model. We assume that it is the mixture of input and output of the R&D process which is the spill over. Concerning the mixed overflow and the total overflow volume changes with time T, our model consider the hazard-rate function in R&D and compare the producer surplus, consumer surplus and the rate of investment. The conclusion is that in the market, enterprises will not necessarily choose RJV; the social surplus generated by RJV is greater than R & D cartel and the R & D competition from the perspective of social surplus; to make the greatest social welfare, the government should guide enterprises to form a RJV. Finally, the article proposes specific ways and policies to tell the government how to guide enterprises to form a RJV. Then the chapter four studies the RJV's four specific organizational model: project organization, industrial technology alliance, and the national research base and generic technology research institutions. We study the four organization forms from two aspects which are common organizational characteristics and appropriate type of technology. We study the organization's operating mechanism from the following four levels: members, funding organizations, organizational management, and organizational results diffusion.Chapter Five is the case study. It studies the electric car industry generic technology R & D organization——Electric Vehicle Industry Association. This thesis studies the electric car industry alliance's organization forms and its operating mechanism, and the role of government in the electric car industry alliance. This part of the study is from the following four aspects: organizational members, organizational funding, organization management, technology diffusion and sharing mechanism. Finally, the thesis summarizes conclusions and proposes future research directions.