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Asymmetric Information-based Accounts Receivable Pledge Financing Of SMEs Research

Posted on:2012-04-25Degree:MasterType:Thesis
Country:ChinaCandidate:Z L ZhangFull Text:PDF
GTID:2189330338992965Subject:Business management
Abstract/Summary:PDF Full Text Request
In the world economic development, SMEs in stimulating employment, foreign exchange income, prosperity and stability of markets and other aspects of society played an invaluable role, but their growth and development of SMEs but there are many problems, Tracing the source of financing difficult problem. New era, as China's market economy continues to advance, as the main driving force of economic growth in China, one of the SMEs, their growth becoming more and more by the government, the importance of SMEs and scholars. The Government introduced various preferential policies to actively support; SMEs themselves also actively explore the use of a variety of ways to solve their financing difficulties, the use of accounts receivable financing is the main means.Pledge of accounts receivable financing is a new financing model in the new period. Pledge of accounts receivable financing in the model, because the existence of asymmetric information is still difficult to overcome the traditional financing model of asymmetric information caused by the adverse selection and moral hazard problems. This article is based on the case of asymmetric information, the introduction of independent third-party security institutions and the ideological use of strategic alliances to optimize the process of accounts receivable financing pledge. Independent third-party security organizations to commercial banks, agents and dual role of guarantor of SMEs involved can effectively alleviate the information asymmetry between bank and credit rationing caused by problems in order to solve the SMEs to use receivables financing difficulties. Independent third party involved in the new pledge of accounts receivable financing for the mitigation of the problem of financing small and medium enterprises to guarantee commercial bank credit to expand its security business security and play an active role, this article from a theoretical point of view to prove its feasibility. And independent third-party financing options and the process involved in the conduct of parties bound by a strategic alliance with the main idea are to be explained.In this paper, the background of asymmetric information in order to accounts receivable financing pledge as the research object, the focus is the study of how to solve the financing process between banks and enterprises because of information asymmetry that is adverse selection and moral hazard problems caused by credit rationing difficulties. This article first pledge of SMEs in the use of accounts receivable financing process exists the phenomenon of credit rationing as the starting point to analyze the phenomenon of credit rationing have come mainly due to adverse selection and moral hazard, and then propose the introduction of independent third-party guarantors to resolve the pledge of accounts receivable financing SMEs to use the adverse selection problem, with the mathematical model, by comparing the analysis, the conclusion is: in the case of third-party involvement, with the value of accounts receivable to provide security the increase will reduce the probability of default of SMEs, commercial banks will reduce lending risk, that is, an independent third party involved in the new pledge of accounts receivable financing model can effectively solve the adverse selection problem caused by credit rationing; and use thinking of the strategic alliance, the use of AHP to select the appropriate members of the League calculated, as long as proper restraint mechanism, a reasonable distribution of benefits to small and medium enterprises can effectively ease the process of accounts receivable financing pledge the moral hazard problem. SMEs use to solve the difficult problem of accounts receivable financing.
Keywords/Search Tags:small and medium-sized enterprises, impawn financing, Adverse selection, Moral risk
PDF Full Text Request
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