A Theoretical Analysis Of Solution To The Difficulty Of Financing Of Small And Medium-Sized Enterprise By Logistical Finance

Small and medium-sized enterprises are regarded as"the most active economic cells"of the country, which developed so rapidly that they have played more and more important role in respect of creating social fortune, promoting national economy, enhancing country's revenue, increasing job opportunity, activating market economy and facilitating people's living. These enterprises become an overwhelming power to support sustaining development of economy. However, financing is a difficult problem facing these enterprises for many years as a result of principal-agent problem.Fortunately, along with the evolution of delivering industry, some economists regarded logistical finance as a key to solve the problem of small and medium-sized enterprises. Based on principal-agent theory and the analytical frame of Diamond (1984), this thesis firstly constructs a model in view of moral hazard to probe the economic foundation of the existence and development of finance institution and delivering finance, and to analyze the predominance of delivering finance over traditional finance institution in respect of possessing goods, capital and information.After the model, this thesis testifies the solidity and applicability of it by game theory. Secondly, we discuss the problem of adverse selection. After our systematic analysis of objects, we find out the influencing factors and conclude them. Finally, based on related data and experts'attitude, this thesis builds up a comprehensive multi-criterion evaluation system to test objects.