Research On Development And Financial Subsidy Of Policy-Oriented Technology Insurance

Innovation mechanism and security mechanism are two sides of an issue, which promote social development together. At present, China is in the peak of technological innovation, as the principal part of R&D, technology enterprises'effect is more and more prominent. There are high-risks in enterprises'R&D, which is called technology risk. Technology risk may lead to failure and loss of enterprises'R&D projects, thus impedes technological innovation, so relevant institutional arrangements are needed. In this background, the Chinese Ministry of Science and Insurance Regulatory Commission jointly issued documents to promote technology insurance at the end of 2006. Technology insurance is an important act for the Government to implement rising through science and education and promoting independent innovation. Viewing the experimental unit, there are still many difficulties to promote technology insurance if depending on the insurance companies only, government must intervene in the technology insurance's business, so it is critical to the development of technology insurance to establish a healthy and reasonable technology insurance system.Technology insurance is new thing in China, and the community is lack of awareness about it. This paper introduces the basic theory of technology risk and technology insurance at first, by analyzing the technology insurance's development status and key issues facing, it indicates that technology insurance can't development of without government support, especially financial subsidy. That is, policy-oriented technology insurance must be implemented. Although the importance of government's financial subsidy to technology insurance has been general concerned, but the specific subsidy idea has not formed yet.Based on the analysis of government behavior in policy-oriented technology insurance, it draws the mode of technology Insurance should be"government leading, business operations". First, the technology insurance market's failure of and financial subsidy's effects on technology insurance provides the theoretical basis, then game model is constructed for further analysis of insurance technology participants'behavior, concludes that Nash equilibrium between the players could not be achieved without the financial subsidy of government. Facing the complex technological risk, only government intervenes to the market can promote the technology insurance effectively. Second, it selects Beijing, Chongqing, Wuhan three areas to analyze technology insurance's subsidy status in our country, and establishes information incentive model on the assumption that government implements a balanced premium subsidy to technology enterprises. Because there is moral hazard between the government and technology enterprises in the case of Information asymmetry, the observable variables should be introduced to expand the information transparency in technology insurance market, and financial subsidy containing both incentives and constraints should be provided insurance companies, then the endogenous optimal financial subsidy scale can be determined in the policy-oriented technology insurance market. Based on the analysis above, it finally proposes relevant policy recommendations about financial subsidy, incentives and supporting services for the development of technology insurance in our country.