Game Analysis Of Asymmetrical Information On Insurance Market

Using the game theory, this dissertation focuses on some asymmetrical informationon the insurance market issues. It is organized as follows:The first part, including one chapter, presents the experimental foundation of riskaversionassumption, the three basic forms of insurance & elementary concepts andcategories of the game theorythetool of economic analysis.The second part, including three chapters, presents the game theory of insurancepricing on asymmetrical information. In chapter two, using the idea of game theory, westudy whether people insure and whether the insurer accept insurance when peopleinsure and which conditions must be satisfied if the insurer accept insurance. If thepolicyholders take full insurance,only must be the price between a insuranc[G, H] econtract works. In chapter three, we examine the cause and influence of asymmetricalinformation on the insurance markets. It then offers a game theory model aboutinsurance pricing according to the nonzerosum game analysis between the insurer andthe insured when moral hazard exists. On the basis of the game analysis, it also presentsa lowest pricing formula and studies the cost of moral hazard simultaneously. In chapterfour, using the game theory, we study the optimal investigation strategies, depending onthe facts that whether the policyholders tell the truth about their risk. We study theoptimal investigation strategies of the insurance company under complete asymmetricalinformation conditions. The research results reveal that under this condition the optimalinvestigation strategies of insurance company are: for the claim of policyholder whohas purchased the lowriskinsurance policies, the company should carry outdeterministic investigation.The third part, including chapter five, using the game theory, we study thecombination problems of the optimal investigation strategies,depending on the facts thatwhether the policyholders tell the truth about their risk and that whether thepolicyholders' moral hazard occurs. We study the optimal investigation strategies of theinsurance company under asymmetrical information conditions. And major measuresare taken to father asymmetrical information on insurance market.