The Problems And Reform Of The Governance Structure In The State-owned Enterprise

This thesis discusses the theory and practices of corporate governance structure from the viewpoint of history and comparison. It puts the emphasis on the governance structure problems in state-owned enterprises under the background of economy transformation in our country and provides guidance to the present reform of state-owned enterprises governance structure. The transformation period and characters of state-owned public property right determine that the governance structure of our state-owned enterprises is different from that under the background of western market economy. High cost of deputization, lack of effective supervision and incentive and disincentive system are the main characters of governance structure of present state-owned enterprises. And the main problems of corporate governance structure include the unreasonable shareholding structure, nominal shareholder meeting, structure imbalance in board of directors, lack of independency in supervision board and invalid supervision, and responsibility confusion between board of directors and managing group. The root of these characters and problems lies in the lack of clear ownership. Therefore the reform should start from clarifying the property rights. To establish the rational property right system is the essential basis to build the effective corporate governance structure and the key issue as well to solve the problem of lack of clear ownership. Under the present conditions, improving state investor system and establishing diversified property right ownership is one of realistic choices.